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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the relationship between the person and the group
in the context of contemporary discussions of rights among lawyers, historians,
and political scientists. It takes issue with liberal interpretations of human
rights, as well as those views put forward by liberalism's prominent critics.
This Article argues that where liberal rights are excessively individualistic and
therefore both self-contradictory and unstable, liberalism's critics concentrate
excessively on the political dimension of human interaction, thereby shortchang-
ing the social origins and purposes of rights. In order to correct this a-social
view of rights and the persons who bear them, this Article seeks to buttress the
argument that important rights, whether understood as natural or historically
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rooted and contingent, inhere in both the person and the group, provided the
group is understood not as an entire nation, culture or subculture, nor as a mere
aggregation of individual interests, but rather as one of the mediating institutions
of local life possessed of its own identity and common good. To defend rights in
contemporary discourse, this Article argues, it is necessary to reconnect our
language and thought with the communalist understanding of rights themselves,
regnant in their medieval origins and in legal practice well into the nineteenth
century.
This Article begins with a discussion of current debates regarding the
nature and role of rights; debates in which the social nature and roots of these
rights receive scant attention. The Article next proceeds to a historical analysis
of the development of rights in medieval canon law and the development of
chartered rights in English localities, up through early American practices re-
garding business corporations and municipalities. The argument, that rights
accorded these corporate groups actually enhanced important rights of the per-
son, will be developed in discussion of the loss of corporate rights through the
destruction of municipalities as independent legal entities and the institution of
generalized corporate charters. Finally, this Article argues that the loss of defi-
nite corporate groups, endowed with group personality and common purpose,
has undermined the rights of persons to participate meaningfully in common
activities that enrich their lives and promote institutions capable of buffering
social life against interference from the political institutions and actors of the
central government. This Article seeks to provide no program of reform. Its aim
is the more limited and realistic one of arguing for a reorientation of thinking
about rights, individuals, and groups such that greater appreciation and respect
for their interrelations may be possible.
II. INDIVIDUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY RIGHTS DISCOURSE
The liberal, individualistic interpretation of human rights dominates
contemporary American legal thought I and practice. 2 For several decades im-
portant scholars of the American constitutional founding have been arguing that
the influence of philosophical liberalism, and of John Locke in particular, has
A segment search of TITLE ("rights") in the Combined U.S. and Canadian Law Review
Database on LexisNexis® over the last 5 years returns over 3,000 hits (which is the maximum).
Further, a search of the same database over the last two years on the phrase "individual rights"
returns in excess of 3,000 hits.
2 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 725, 732 (1998) ("The technical rules of
American standing doctrine require that plaintiffs suffer direct, individuated, and redressable
harms before they can invoke the power of federal courts to vindicate claims of constitutional
rights.... This.. emphasis on plaintiffs as vindicating their own interests, not generalized griev-
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been overstated . But the Lockean individualist reading of the founding as the
triumph of individual rights, 4 along with the more generalized Whig reading of
history as the unfolding of individual rights,5 continues to dominate contempo-
rary discourse. Moreover, contemporary liberal theorists have insisted on the
continuing, paramount importance of individual rights as the grounding for any
just order.
6
Contemporary liberal rights discourse demands that rights be universal,
that is, that they be fully individual, resting on no qualifications, such as mem-
bership in a particular political, social or racial group; indeed, such is the (lib-
eral) definition of a "natural" right. 7 According to contemporary liberals, be-
3 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988)
(reviewing the extensive literature dealing with the civic republican influence on the American
founding).
4 See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 48-49 (Prometheus Books
1986) (1690) (arguing that human beings are "born ... with a title to perfect freedom and an un-
controlled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature, equally with any other
man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property-
that is, his life, liberty, and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men, but to judge of
and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves"); see also
THOMiAs L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 2 (1988) (asserting that "it is in
Locke's works that one finds the true integration into one edifice, and hence the full exploration of
the meaning, of the three most important pillars supporting the Founders' moral vision: Nature or
'Nature's God'; property, or the 'pursuit of happiness'; and the dignity of the individual as ra-
tional human being, parent and citizen"). But see BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN
INDIVIDUALISM 4 (1994) (stating that "late 18th-century Americans (like some of their rural de-
scendants) really did defend a reformed-Protestant, communal theory of good, and were not indi-
vidualist"); see also THEODORE J. Lowt, THE END OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA 11 (1995) ("[T]he
single defining attribute of liberalism is individualism. Liberalism embraces the individual as the
purpose of society and the state. Liberalism defines the individual in opposition to the collectiv-
ity.").
5 See Renata Salecl, Rights in Psychoanalytic and Feminist Perspective, 16 CARDozo L. REV.
1121, 1132 (1994) (tracing modem human rights to the development of the Kantian subject, by
which the rights of one individual came to be defined in opposition to the rights of other individu-
als); see generally HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERI'RETATION OF HISTORY (G. Bell and
Sons, Ltd. 1950) (1931) (arguing that our understanding of history has been undermined by a
persistent concern among historians to see it as the story of the constant progress of freedom and
enlightenment over superstition and tyranny).
6 See RONALD DwORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193 (1977) ("[Tlhe general benefit
cannot be good ground for abridging rights, even when the benefit in question is a heightened
respect for law."); see also John Rawls, Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY, 3rd series 58 (Peter Laslett and WG Runcimann, eds.) (1967) ("[W]e believe that as a
matter of principle each member of society has an inviolability founded on justice which even the
welfare of everyone else cannot override, and that a loss of freedom for some is not made right by
a sum of greater satisfactions enjoyed by many.").
7 See R.H. Helmholz, Natural Human Rights: The Perspective of the lus Commune, 52 CATH.
U. L. REV. 301, 301-302 (2003) (Natural rights are held "not simply because the government of
the day concedes them to us. We hold them because we are human."). But see Edward Taylor, A
Primer on Critical Race Theory, 19 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 122, 123 (1998) (Critical race
3
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cause only individuals are capable of pain and joy, only individuals can be
treated justly or unjustly; thus, only individuals can have rights.8 Richard Ep-
stein has argued that group rights, by which he means distribution by the gov-
ernment of different levels of goods and protections according to membership in
racial or other categories, threaten to harden into a system of formal classifica-
tions dangerous to liberty. 9 Katharine Inglis Butler decries advocates of race-
based distribution of voting rights for being "disturbingly oblivious to the poten-
tial for group rights to undercut our philosophical base and ultimately threaten
the nation's existence." 10 Thus, distribution of rights according to membership
in any classification seems contradictory in contemporary terms. Even critics of
modem liberalism like Morton Horwitz see rights as inherently individualistic.
11
This is not to say that, according to liberals, no group should receive
protection from the state. Voluntary associations, for example, may be accorded
rights, in Epstein's view, but these rights are merely additive, aggregating the
rights of their individual members. 12 Association itself is merely one individual
right, to be valued in accordance with its advancement of individual autonomy
and interests. t 3 The group qua group-the collective entity in which individuals
theory, or "CRT", "is deeply dissatisfied with traditional civil rights litigation and liberal reforms.
Having seen many of the gains of the civil rights movement rendered irrelevant by an increasingly
conservative judiciary, CRT scholars have lost faith in traditional legal remedies. They have seen
restrictive definitions of merit, fault, and causation render much of current antidiscrimination law
impotent .... CRT notes that color blindness makes no sense in a society in which people, on the
basis of group membership alone, have historically been, and continue to be, treated differently....
By insisting on a rhetoric that disallows reference to race, blacks can no longer name their reality
or point out racism.").
8 See Robert Paul Wolff, The Concept of Social Justice, in FROM CONTRACT TO COMMUNITY:
POLITICAL THEORY AT THE CROSSROADs 65, 68 (Fred R. Dallmayr ed., 1978) ("Manifestly, all
suffering is someone's suffering, all joy someone's joy-and only an individual agent can have a
right or a duty.").
9 See Richard A. Epstein, Tuskegee Modern, Or Group Rights Under the Constitution, 80 Ky.
L.J. 869, 880-81 (1992) ("No system of government can claim the allegiance of all its citizens if it
extends its protections to only those that are fortunate enough to fall within a protected class. For
all the concerns about caste, and about subordinate status that might be created by unequal social
conditions, there is almost no awareness of the far greater dangers that a social order runs of build-
ing formal and explicit classifications into the fabric of the law.").
10 Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Fair Representation for Mi-
norities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 622 (1995); see also
id. at 623 (Group rights exist on a spectrum from "apportionment of social benefits along group
lines, as in Belgium, to peaceful partitioning into new countries, as between the Czechs and the
Slovaks, to violent splintering, as in Lebanon and Yugoslavia, to genocide, as in Rwanda.").
I See Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 399-400 (1988) (stating
that rights are "conceived in radical individualism and continue to express an individualistic per-
spective").
12 See Epstein, supra note 9, at 878-79.
13 See id. at 877-78 ("First Amendment cases like NAACP v. Alabama are best understood not
[Vol. 107
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join on the basis of some common goal, interest or characteristic-is not a proper
subject of rights in contemporary discourse.
Thus, in part, rights conflicts may be seen as the inevitable result of di-
verse individuals pursuing the inevitably diverse goods of liberal society.
14
Such a vision has produced an ironic situation in which much criticism of indi-
vidual rights has been rooted self-consciously in the language of individualism.
With the group seen as merely a means by which individuals pursue their own
interests, with no real, common good of its own, the very definition of rights
becomes a conflict among interests. A number of traditional liberal rights have
been attacked on the ground that they undermine other more important rights.
For example, the "old liberal" attachment to the right of all individuals to the
free and full use of their property has been challenged in favor of the right of all
individuals to shelter. 15 Another example is the challenge leveled at the right of
as a special gloss on First Amendment theory, but as an observation that freedom of association is
part of all forms of individual freedom, as applicable in the area of the First Amendment as any-
where else."). Cited in NAACP v. State of Ala. ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), in which
the court sided with the NAACP in refusing to disclose its membership lists on the grounds that
this would interfere with freedom of association.); see also id. at 879-80 (noting a potential prob-
lem of coercion in the formation of all associations); see also id. at 882 (arguing the persistent
danger of self interested action, including on the part of various groups, means groups must be
kept in check so as to prevent their commandeering "the legal and moral power of the state" for
their own ends).
14 IsAi BERLIN, LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 214 (Henry Hardy ed.)
(2002) (commenting on the futility of making individual rights paramount in societies without a
diversity of goods). Berlin stated:
the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the
diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized is demonstrably false. If, as
I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle com-
patible with each other, then the possibility of conflict-and of tragedy-can
never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social.
15 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 305, 345 (1994) ("[T]he right to exclude has traditionally been broader and more absolute
than justified by the particular benefits that right secures. Property owners ordinarily have the
right to exclude others from their property even when the exclusion would serve no demonstrable
social or private benefit and even when the balance of interests tips in favor of allowing access.");
see also Mihans v. The Municipal Court for the Berkeley-Albany Judicial District of Alameda
County, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 489 (1970) ("[I]f the tenant is insolvent or does not have property
subject to execution he must immediately surrender the premises; if he is solvent he cannot be
compelled to do so . . .his is an 'invidious discrimination."'); see also John M. Payne, Recon-
structing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 555, 564 (2000)
(discussing Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.S.
1983)). Payne stated:
[t]he actual constitutional basis of Mount Laurel 11 is that the New Jersey
Constitution embodies an implicit constitutional right to shelter. If so, explain-
ing Mount Laurel 1 becomes simple (although hardly uncontroversial).
Armed with such a right, Mount Laurel plaintiffs would have a straightfor-
ward case to make, which in its most dramatic form would be that the gov-
ernment must either provide shelter directly to those needing it, or that it must
5
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employers to contract freely with employees by those espousing the right of
workers to receive a just or "living" wage. 16 Historically, arguments concerning
economic rights have J roduced calls to replace owner friendly rights with
worker friendly rights.
It is important at this point to recognize the integral role of economic
rights in liberal theory. Liberalism fundamentally is about human freedom, de-
fined as individual autonomy and secured through individual rights. 18 Whether
in the sphere of economics or of matters implicated by more social issues, pro-
ponents of rights today justify those rights through appeals to, as they seek
through them to foster, individual choice. 19 In this context economic rights such
as the right to government payments covering the cost of physical necessities,
are intended to provide the means necessary to enable meaningful individual
insure that other housing providers do so, at costs affordable to people of all
incomes.
16 See J.M. Spectar, Pay Me Fairly, Kathie Lee! The WTO, The Right to a Living Wage and a
Proposed Protocol, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 61, 69 (2000) ("Notwithstanding the
many approaches to the concept of human rights, (including natural rights, moral theories and
positivism), the living wage appears to qualify as a fundamental human right.").
17 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 485 (Tucker, ed.
1978)). Marx stated:
[t]he average price of wage labor is the minimum wage, i.e., that quantum of
the means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the laborer in
bare existence as a laborer. What, therefore, the wage laborer appropriates by
means of his labor merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence.
We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products
of labor, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction
of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labor of
others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this ap-
propriation, under which the laborer lives merely to increase capital, and is al-
lowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.
18 See Eric J. Mitnick, Taking Rights Spherically: Formal and Collective Aspects of Legal
Rights, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 409, 410 (1999) ("Liberals conceive of rights as critical ele-
ments in the constitution of individual freedom. And, insofar as freedom is a necessary condition
for, and an instrument of, human self-realization, according rights to individuals expresses respect
for basic human dignity."); see also David Abraham, Are Rights the Right Thing? Individual
Rights, Communitarian Purposes and America's Problems (review of MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE), 25 CONN. L. REV. 947, 948 (ar-
guing that in both economic and social issues rights proponents today look for justification and
goals to the fostering of individual choice).
19 See Jeremy Waldron, Particular Values and Critical Morality, 77 CAL. L. REv. 561 (1989)
("The liberal argument for the respondent's [Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)] position
was that, whether such a right is fundamental depends not on its historical roots, but on its impor-
tance for the fulfillment of basic human needs. Homosexual intimacy can be classed alongside
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choice. And this emphasis on rights as promoters of individual autonomy
extends beyond liberalism. For example, the Marxist critique of liberal rights
has been reinterpreted in recent years as a rejection of economic exploitation
and promotion of a set of individual rights-of transcendence over "bourgeois"
rights in favor of each individual's equal right to develop his or her own "ca-
pacities, desires, and personalities."
2 1
Other radical critiques of liberal individualism have severely questioned
the utility of both groups and rights in constructing a just society. Critical race
theory argues that the current structure of rights is the product of unjust state
practices encouraged by dominant racial groups aiming to define race in a man-
ner conducive to their own rank and privileges, and in the process establishing
an oppressive legal structure. 22 Angela P. Harris asserts "that racial groups are
not 'natural' groups but social creations, and law has played an important role in
this creation."23 Yet, while racial groups are not "natural," according to Harris,
they must be taken into account; exclusive focus on defeating discrimination
will ?roduce supposedly neutral standards that in fact buttress racial subordina-
tion. On this view both the definition of groups and legal rights themselves
are products of oppressive ideology. 25 Critical race theorists seek transcen-
dence over maintenance of human rights, which for them have no inherent
status; the proper goal concerns "racial justice," which requires achievement of
substantive equality among racial groups.26
20 See BRUCE FROHNEN, THE NEW COMMUNTARIANS AND THE CRISIS OF MODERN LIBERALISM
20-22 (1996) (arguing that liberalism aims to eliminate poverty as one of many ills preventing
individuals from leading full and satisfying lives).
21 See Arthur DiQuattro, Liberal Theory and the Idea of Communist Justice, 92 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 1, 93 (1998).
22 See, e.g, Laura E. G6mez, Race Mattered: Racial Formation and the Politics of Crime in
Territorial New Mexico 49 UCLA L. Rav. 1395, 1395-1397 (discussing MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FoIusrtoN IN THE UNITED STATES 60 (2d ed. 1994).
23 See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century
Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1927 (2000) ("The equation of race law with equality law tends
to obscure the law's participation in creating and maintaining racial distinctions, and thus subtly
perpetuates the notion that races just naturally are and that equality law simply provides a neutral
forum for conflict among them.").
24 See id. at 2006-2007 (criticizing emphasis on formal discrimination in the courts for under-
mining affirmative action and other policies aimed at redistributing power along racial lines).
25 See id. at 1952 (discussing the role of race in "determining the scope of legal rights"
wrongly because it "was untouched by the norm of racial equality").
26 See id. at 1935 ("[Tlhe preservation of 'the social' as a sphere beyond equality allowed for
the continued creation and maintenance of racial inequality outside the official reach of the state."
Meanwhile, "the most important legacy of Reconstruction for the new century would be the idea
of 'equality,' a principle that nonwhite legal activists and their white allies would use as both a
sword and a shield against racial hierarchy.").
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Feminists also have questioned the proper status of individual rights, ar-
guing that "human rights are actually men's rights" used by the state to control
sexuality and conceal institutional domination and oppression. 27 Renata Salecl
takes this critique in an individualist direction, praising the liberal project for its
role in providing individual women with a neutral standpoint from which to
criticize society's political, economic and social structures. 28  But the main-
stream of feminist thought generally is seen as hostile to abstract human rights
on account of their "male" nature. Rights, on the feminist view, assume a
male character inimical to meaningful association; they rest on and further male
reason and a male separation of persons one from another such that they actually
impede the development of women's full, interconnected humanity. The state,
then, must establish a just order in society; rights themselves must be made sub-
servient to the needs or interests of the oppressed female group.
Communitarianism offers another seemingly radical critique of liberal
individualism. Mary Ann Glendon argues that liberalism's focus on individual
rights breaks down community, separating individual from individual to the
detriment of all.3 1 But the communitarian focus is on the need to balance rights
and responsibilities. 32 Thus the communitarian critique of individual rights is
not radical; rights are good, on this view, but ought not to be the sole focus of
27 See Salecl, supra note 5, at 1126-27.
28 See id. at 1129. (arguing that patriarchy is discernible only because of the abstract, uncon-
nected nature of the self posited by Descartes and Kant).
29 See id. at 1127 (quoting Catherine MacKinnon: "Abstract rights will authorize the male
experience of the world").
30 See id. at 1127 (arguing that, for feminists, human rights are patriarchal on account of their
basis in liberal premises, most particularly that the distinction between each individual and all
others is essential to the definition of the human person).
31 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
143 (1991) ("Our overblown rights rhetoric and our vision of the rights-bearer as an autonomous
individual channel our thoughts away from what we have in common and focus them on what
separates us."); see also CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF
DEMOCRACY 98 (1995) ("The replacement of informal types of association by formal systems of
socialization and control weakens social trust, undermines the willingness both to assume respon-
sibility for oneself and to hold others accountable for their actions, destroys respect for authority,
and thus turns out to be self-defeating.").
32 See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsi-
bilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 650 ("Communitarians believe that even (or perhaps espe-
cially) in a rights-conscious society, rights have limits, and involve concomitant responsibilities.
For example, one has a right to trial by jury, but one also has the responsibility to serve on a jury
when called upon. Citizens have the right to be secure from unwarranted governmental intrusion,
but air traffic controllers and railroad engineers must submit to periodic drug testing in deference
to the legitimate interests of the community.").
[Vol. 107
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss3/13
2005] INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CORPORATE RIGHTS AND THE DIVERSITY OF GROUPS 797
public life; as Amitai Etzioni argues, "a good society requires a carefully main-
tained equilibrium of order and autonomy."
33
In overemphasizing the importance of individual rights, according to
communitarians, liberals miss the importance of social groups in forming good
lives.34  Glendon points to associational life as crucial to "systems of self-
government" on account of its nurturing of habits of mutual assistance, political
skills and efficient provision of social services. 35 Nonetheless, communitarians
accept the fundamental individualism of liberalism, subjecting social groups to
the logic as well as to the power of the state. Etzioni argues that a moral society
should respect individual autonomy, as that individual ought to commit recipro-
cally to social institutions supporting autonomy. 36 Glendon notes fears raised
by civil society and the nature of small groups, including discord that impedes
national cohesion and threatens the state, possible backwardness and narrow-
mindedness, oppression of groups' own members combined with intolerance of
outsiders and possible fostering of militant nationalism and fundamentalism.
37
Such fears led William Galston to recommend using the state-run education
system to teach authenticity, toleration and non-discrimination-overtly liberal
values emphasizing the primacy of individual autonomy and choice.
38
Communitarians share with liberals an emphasis on individuals as
largely autonomous, self-interested actors properly most concerned with their
own flourishing.39 Communitarians also focus on the state as a form of national
33 AMITAt ETzIoNI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 4 (1996).
34 See Mary Ann Glendon, Individualism and Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal
Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 BYU L. REv. 385, 394 (1993) ("[T]he vocabulary
and conceptual apparatus of modem law and politics is primarily geared to the relations among
individuals, the state, and the market. Legal theory lacks adequate terms and concepts for grap-
pling with the 'thousand different types' of social groups that provide the immediate context for
most people's lives and that flourish within and among the megastructures of the state and the
market.").
35 See id. at 390-91.
36 See Timothy L. Fort, The First Man and the Company Man: The Common Good, Transcen-
dence, and Mediating Institutions, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 391, 393 (1998) (discussing AMITAI ETZIONI,
THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY xviii (1996)).
37 See Glendon, supra note 34, at 391-92.
38 See WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 255 (1991) (discussing the need to provide children with "critical distance" from
the values of their families so as to foster individual flourishing and toleration, lest "parental
brainwashing" interfere with development of the proper, liberal values).
39 See CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHCS OF AUTHENTICITY 3, 15, 26 (1991) (arguing that each
individual requires one of a number of possible "backgrounds" against which to develop his or her
identity, but that these "things that matter" cannot be allowed to prevent individuals from being
fundamentally true to themselves rather than any particular social attachment because only inde-
pendent moral choice promotes true, full humanity).
9
Frohnen: The One and the Many: Individual Rights, Corporate Rights and the
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW
community providing proper values and inculcating these values in the people.
40
Communitarians focus on the state as the guarantor of appropriate individual
rights and duties, thus extending the liberal opposition to ceding substantive
autonomy or power to the groups that stand between the person and the state.41
Like their sometime classical republican allies, communitarians see mediating
institutions as potentially oppressive and as enhancing a regrettable distance
from public life - the form of life that is, on this view, properly central to our
existence. 42 As a result, communitarianism also shares with republicanism a
hostility toward mediating institutions-the local groups that mediate between
individual persons, society and the state; and it is these institutions which estab-
lish the empathy and fellow feeling necessary for enlightened politics or the
common pursuit of reasoned dialogue rooted in mutual respect.43
In contrast, multiculturalism promotes groups, in part through an appar-
ently thoroughgoing critique of liberal rights. Anthony Anghie, for example,
argues that international law, with its emphasis on rights, was created by Euro-
pean colonialists as a means to denigrate indigenous cultures in order to justify
conquest and colonization.44  Will Kymlicka charges that providing minority
cultures with mere access to equal rights and opportunities within the majority
culture, rather than a separate, autonomous sphere of action, amounts to oppres-
sion because it denies minority cultures their own freedom and equality.
45
Kymlicka's criticism focuses attention on the apparent tension between individ-
ual rights and group autonomy. Put succinctly, groups may wish to oppose or
even deny the validity of liberal, individual rights.
4 6
40 See id. at 46-48 (arguing that partial groupings such as those based on ethnicity are poten-
tially dangerous as they breed atomism and keep individuals from forging common political pur-
poses by identifying "with their political society as a community").
41 See Kraig James Powell, The Other Double Standard: Communitariansm, Federalism, and
American Constitutional Law, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69, 74-75 (1996).
42 See Fort, supra note 36, at 405; see also id. at 397-98 (arguing that republicanism is a re-
sponse against interest group liberalism, seeing groups as factions that take away from the com-
mon good defined as the product of reasoned, trusting political deliberation).
43 See id. at 400-402 (criticizing republican theorists in particular for discounting the role of
religious thought and mediating institutions in providing the emotional and theoretical grounds for
reasoned civil dialogue).
Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-
Century International Law, 40 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 1, 7 (1999).
45 See WILL KYMLICKA, MuLTIcuLTuRAL CIIZENsHIP 11 (1995) (criticizing liberal calls for
assimilation).
4G See Gerald Doppelt, Illiberal Cultures and Group Rights: A Critique of Multiculturalism in
Kymlicka, Taylor, and Nussbaum, 12 J. CONTEmp. LEGAL IssuEs 661, 661-62 (2002) (setting forth
two obvious reasons why the phenomenon of illiberal groups constitutes the most powerful litmus
test for any viable multicultural liberalism. The first is the liberal worry that the price of group
rights may be the violation or erosion of basic individual rights and liberties. The second is the
liberal worry that strengthening people's loyalty to an ethnic, national, racial or religious group,
[Vol. 107
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The compromising "multicultural liberal" response to the problem of il-
liberal minorities is to allow such groups to exist, in principle, but subject them
to a liberal rights regime, utilizing criteria derived from liberal ideals to deter-
mine which cultures to protect and what transformations to demand in exchange
for such protection. 47 Other multiculturalists, like Kymlicka, would provide
exemptions from some liberal, individual rights to certain groups,48 while still
others, like Charles Taylor, would insist that all groups be respected only to the
extent that they abide by basic universal rights.
49
Multiculturalists have not rejected rights talk. Indeed, a whole set of
multicultural rights currently exist, including rights to use minority languages
and to maintain sectarian schools.50 Moreover, multiculturalism's assertion of
the "right" to freedom from prevalent government directives regarding which
language to use and the potential refusal to allow maintenance of sectarian
schools shows the essential identification of even multiculturalism with the con-
temporary liberal mind-set. Multiculturalism assumes that the state has both the
power and the legitimate authority to determine which languages people will
speak in various venues and what forms of instruction will be allowed. Multi-
culturalism's claim to respect the rights of groups rests on its assertion that mi-
nority cultures require a specific and limited exemption from the exercise of
state power in certain cultural arenas, such as those regulating public language.
In some ways the multiculturalist critique can be seen as merely another
version of liberalism, recognizing group rights as a necessary means of provid-
ing individuals with an equal, substantive opportunity to achieve personal
autonomy.5 1 More generally, for multiculturalists:
and the particularistic identity it may foster, can threaten the wider moral and political identity
among citizens required both by a stable democracy and respect for human dignity).
47 See id. at 672 (arguing that group rights must serve liberal moral purposes).
48 See KYMLICKA, supra note 45, at 168 (advocating exempting some groups from federal bills
of rights and judicial review).
49 See Doppelt, supra note 46, at 673 (discussing Taylor and the tension between group auton-
omy and individual rights).
50 See Timothy Macklem, Faith as a Secular Value, 45 McGILL L. J. 1, 6 (2000) (citing Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at art
18, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.hri.com/Uninfo/treaties/l.shmtl (last modified
Sept. 29, 1999) and arguing that multicultural rights protect activities and institutions necessary
for participation in certain minority cultures); see also Gerald Doppelt, supra note 46, at 664
(arguing that multicultural rights such as that of Francophone Canadians to use French in Cana-
dian courts and the rights of indigenous peoples to self-rule and territorial integrity lack any basis
in universal rights of citizenship, instead being "based on cultural membership in particular na-
tional and ethnic groups with claims to self-protection.").
51 See Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities,
67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 615, 631 (1992) (arguing that group rights may be a temporary necessity
in order to make up for past discrimination); see also id. at 640 (presenting affirmative action
policies as a needed corrective to past discrimination).
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the basic building blocks of a just society continue to be
founded on the protection of basic citizenship rights and the
nurturing of the capacities of individuals. However, in certain
cases, justice also requires the recognition of traditions and spe-
cific ways of life that are unique to members of non-dominant
cultural minorities.
52
Multiculturalists seek, not the elimination of liberal rights or even the recogni-
tion of groups as themselves the proper subjects of rights, but rather recognition
that respect for the individual requires "respect for the intrinsic value of the dif-
ferent cultural forms in and through which individuals actualize their humanity
and express their unique personalities."
53
There is a deep affinity between "strong" multiculturalists like Kym-
licka and the "multicultural liberalism" analyzed by Gerald Doppelt; both see
groups as potentially dangerous to individual autonomy. 54 "Multicultural liber-
alism" seeks, not to integrate, but rather to balance individuals with groups, in
part by balancing minority with majority cultures on the grounds that liberal
ends rooted in individual autonomy require respect for derivative and instrumen-
tal group rights."
This is not to say that multiculturalists do not seek to protect and foster
groups; clearly they do. And in this pursuit they are willing to give up some of
contemporary liberalism's attachment to equality as a ground for individual
autonomy and dignity.56 But not even multiculturalists seek to protect just any
group; rather they seek to protect "cultures" they value. The essential concern
of multiculturalism is the protection of national minorities and, to a lesser ex-
tent, ethnic minorities-groups with their own distinctive customs and modes of
life that are outnumbered by a maority, and therefore, are not likely to be pro-
tected by the democratic process.
52 Ayelet Shachar, Two Critiques of Multiculturalism, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 253, 254 (2001).
53 Steven C. Rockefeller, Comment, in CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALIsM: EXAMINING
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNriON 87 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1992).
54 Doppelt, supra note 46, at 661 (defining multicultural liberalism as "a revisionist liberalism
which appeals to liberal ideals in order to defend special group rights for national, ethnic, and
religious minorities, independently of the individual rights their members possess.").
55 Id. at 669 (arguing that minority cultures require group rights in order to further individual
autonomy and freedom to make life choices); see also id. at 666 (arguing that meaningful choices
and life options require "that individuals have access to a societal culture with which they identify
as an expression of who they are.").
56 Id. at 673 ("[Iun seeking to protect established cultural identity, Kymlicka and Taylor unfor-
tunately end up protecting illiberal minority cultures distorted by inequalities of gender, race,
religion, and ethnicity and incompatible with liberal-democratic ideals and norms of equal recog-
nition.").
57 Id. at 665; see also id. at 661 (stating that multicultural liberalism seeks to protect minority
cultures while making the majority culture or nation more just in the process).
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Thus, multiculturalists look to groups only at the "macro" level of full
cultures or ethnic identities. And it is through this emphasis that multicultural-
ists may exacerbate the danger of political and cultural balkanization by splitting
the people's loyalties and potentially setting one culture against another within a
particular nation.58 Emphasis on such metastructures undermines opportunities
for individual persons to identify with and grow through interaction in groups
because these groups are simply too large for the kind of intimate relations nec-
essary. 59 Moreover, especially if racial classifications are socially or ideologi-
cally constructed, as critical race theorists claim,60 it seems highly likely that
continuing focus on the state's use of such categories in the distribution of rights
and goods would lead to increased tension and conflict among such groups in
pursuit of power. What is more, such conflict empowers the state, or the elites
running it, to create, modify or even destroy rights in the name of a more just
order.6 1 Society increasingly will become a mere set of antagonistic cultural
groups jockeying for political favors.
62
III. REDISCOVERING THE GROUP
Radical critiques of liberal rights feed into political and cultural ten-
sions, exacerbating the group-based conflict and intolerance they are designed to
combat. Yet liberal, individual rights pit person against person, burying the
very idea of a common good beneath layers of individual self-interest. And the
resultant, atomistic individual is insecure, even in his or her enjoyment of liberal
rights. Those rights conflict, and the individual becomes increasingly isolated
and weak in the face of various interest-based majorities-of-the-moment. Thus,
the most all-encompassing group, the people as a whole, in whose name the
state acts, may end up suffocating the individual. As Alexis de Tocqueville
observed already in nineteenth century America, formal rights cannot protect
against majority tyranny; the democratic majority can control public opinion,
the legislature, the executive, the police, juries, and even judges so as to enforce
58 See Butler, supra note 10, at 622.
59 Fort, supra note 36, at 411 (summarizing contemporary psychological and anthropological
arguments to the effect that individuals can develop genuine relationships with only a limited
number of other persons).
60 See Harris, supra note 23, at 2006-2007.
61 See generally THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY (2004) (examining the results of race-based governmental policies in five nations and
finding that in every case those policies lead to further social and economic stratification along
with increased racial tension and state interference, including state-made classification systems).
62 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 81-96 (Stuart
Gilbert trans., Doubleday Anchor Books 1955) (1856) (arguing that the old regime in France had
reduced its upper classes to a set of bickering elites incapable of serving or even recognizing the
common good by taking away from them the responsibility and practice of interacting with and
earing for members of lower classes connected with them).
13
Frohnen: The One and the Many: Individual Rights, Corporate Rights and the
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
its will and make freedom of thought almost impossible; using its political and
moral authority, the majority can banish dissenters from society, leaving them
with their formal rights but cutting them off from the only social and political
life available. 63 Moreover, a form of "soft despotism," in Tocqueville's view,
comes to dominate in democratic societies that have answered the call of indi-
vidualism. Each individual, separated from his or her fellows, sees himself or
herself as a small, powerless creature facing a massive majority and the state
that serves it, and surrenders control over his or her own life in order to avoid
the ire of the majority and further isolation.
64
Rights, then, are not self-sustaining. On their own, rights can not pro-
tect the individual from the mass. Rather, rights require an atmosphere of mu-
tual forbearance and respect in order to flourish, and aid individual persons in
flourishing. Thus, Tocqueville emphasized the importance of widespread own-
ership of property for the safety of property rights in America; everyone owning
property, everyone had reason to respect property rights.
65
None of this is to deny the essential insight that rights constitute impor-
tant spheres of autonomy. But this insight does not belong to modem liberal-
ism; rather, its roots go back at least as far as 12
th century England.66 Moreover,
rights are not the product of liberal or proto-liberal individualism, but of the
communalist interactions of medieval Europe. 67 A more nuanced and accurate
vision of rights would take account of the necessary structure of freedom, in-
cluding social structures protecting social freedoms and a vision of the common
good channeling individual action in ways consistent with the rights of all.
68
Such a vision would respect cultures, but through their constitutive elements
63 See ALEXIS DR TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 252-57 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1848).
64 See id. at 258.
65 Id. at 262-63.
66 BRIAN TIERNEY, Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts and Contexts, in, RIGHTS,
LAWS AND INFALLIBILITY IN MEDIEVAL THOUGHT 636 (Variorum 1997) ("[T]he clearest use of
such language to specify 'a zone of human autonomy', 'a neutral sphere of personal choice', is
found in a group of English glossators of the 1180's.").
67 Id. at 626 ("[ln the vigorous, fluid, expanding society of the twelfth century, old rights
were persistently asserted and new ones insistently demanded .... Cathedral canons asserted their
ights against bishops. Bishops and barons defended their rights against kings. Newly-founded
communes sometimes bought their rights and sometimes fought for them.").
68 See, e.g., JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHIcs: NATURAL LAW IN THE W. WORLD 324 (J.J.
Doherty, trans., B. Herder Book Co. rev. ed. 1965) ("[Social freedom] implies religious, civil,
political, economic and social liberty. Social liberty consists in man's self-determination in regard
to his existential ends, without hindrance from individuals or society. From these ends spring
man's original rights to freedom. Hence, freedom is based on rights, not rights on freedom. It is
not to be forgotten that within the framework of the common good exists the wide sphere of free-
dom of the members of society for the pursuit of their various interests, since in the free develop-
ment of man and his personality consists one of the existential ends.").
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(e.g. families, townships, and local voluntary associations) rather than their me-
tastructures; it would reflect the fact that groups need not oppress their individ-
ual members. Mediating groups, townships and voluntary associations in par-
ticular, in many ways enhance rights by making their exercise more active and
meaningful. Thus, the loss of group rights means the loss of rights for individ-
ual persons. For example, Richard Epstein notes how the state of Alabama capi-
talized on the reduction of municipalities to mere administrative units of the
state, subject to their every political whim, in order to disenfranchise African-
Americans in the city of Tuskegee, with court approval. 69 A majority African-
American town with real, corporate rights, would have had the legal means and
standing to defend itself against, or at least, resist the state's attempts to disen-
franchise its people.
Rights are important; as Tocqueville pointed out, without them only
force will rule.70 Moreover, one of democracy's greatest achievements is its
making "the idea of political rights penetrate right down to the least of citizens,
just as the division of property puts the general idea of property rights within
reach of all," thus assuring their widespread application and respectability.
7 1
But excessive individualism endangers the attitudes, traditions and corporate
groups that uphold ordered liberty and rights. Tocqueville saw hope for liberty
and for the rights he loved, not in increased individualism, but rather through
recognition of the important role played by mediating groups in fostering or-
dered liberty. The administrative decentralization provided by America's fed-
eral structure and strong tradition of township government meant that there were
a number of political authorities that could block or at least soften the effects of
centralized actions that might prove oppressive. 72 In addition, through local
group participation individuals gained the social connections necessary to bind
people together to form self-sufficient communities capable of opposing in-
fringements on their rights.
73
A later French political thinker, Bertrand de Jouvenel, elaborated on the
necessity of associations mediating between individual persons and the state.
According to Jouvenel, the French revolutionary state had become totalitarian
"[b]y destroying in the name of the mass, which it claimed to represent, though
69 Epstein, supra note 9, at 870-71 (discussing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),
which upheld Alabama state redistricting eliminating black voting influence, on the grounds that
the state had the power to create, destroy, or administer its municipalities as it saw fit).
70 See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 63, at 238.
71 Id. at 239.
72 Id. at 262-63.
73 See id. at 189 (arguing that American children learn from an early age to rely on themselves
to set rules for their own games and, later, to look to their neighbors rather than the government to
make local improvements).
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its existence was only a fiction, the various groups, whose life was a reality."
74
Jouvenel emphasized the importance of "makeweights"-interests representing
sections of the nation, be they based in class, region, or profession-in limiting
the potentially absolute power of the state. 75 In the name of "the mass," the
French revolutionary regime swept away these makeweights, leaving individu-
als isolated, causing them to lose "the instinct of association and the tendency to
form societies within society, which had in other days been the precious bul-
warks of liberty."
' 76
An important strain of political and legal thought emphasizes the neces-
sity of strong mediating groups for the protection of individual rights and lib-
erty. The multiplicity of authorities provided by these groups - the multiplica-
tion of centers of power and legitimation to which individual persons may recur
in time of need - increases the person's ability to carve out a sphere of personal
freedom of action. Sociologist Robert Nisbet argued that "[i]ndividual liberty..
I is only possible within the context of a plurality of social authorities, moral
codes, and historical traditions, all of which, in organic articulation, serve at one
and the same time as 'the inns and resting places' of the human spirit and inter-
mediary barriers to the power of the state over the individual."77 Medieval
Europe provided the seedbed for rights because it was pervaded by competition
among vigorous secular authorities and a separate, institutionalized Catholic
Church. "Since neither the spiritual nor temporal power could wholly dominate
the other, medieval government never congealed into a rigid theocratic absolut-
ism in which rights theories could never have taken root."
78
The medieval European multiplicity of authorities extended beyond
king and pope and took on institutionalized, juridical form. Harold Berman has
shown the importance of the existence of multiple types of law in the early mid-
dle ages for the growth of rights and liberty. According to Berman, the overlap-
ping of courts, forms of law and jurisdictions meant that "the same person might
be subject to the ecclesiastical courts in one type of case, the king's courts in
another, his lord's courts in a third, the manorial court in a fourth, a town court
in a fifth, a merchants' court in a sixth." 79 The result was the growth of a legal
tradition in which the person was recognized as the center of a nexus of rela-
tions, able to exercise meaningful choices and having individual dignity, rights
and an appropriate sphere of autonomy.
74 BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, ON POWER 326 (J. F. Huntington, trans., Liberty Fund 1993).
75 Id. at 317-18.
76 Id. at 320-21.
77 Robert Nisbet, Uneasy Cousins, in FREEDOM AND VIRTUE: THE CONSERVATIVE/
LIBERTARIAN DEBATE, 38-39 (George W. Carey ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1998).
78 TIERNEY, supra note 66, at 626.
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In addition to protecting individual persons from the state (and, in con-
temporary circumstances, the multinational corporation),80 groups themselves
embody individual purposes; they provide their members with the means by
which to exercise individual autonomy in forging common ends. 81 Liberalism's
hostility toward groups mediating between the individual person and the central-
ized state has resulted in the stripping of important rights from those groups.
82
And with the loss of these corporate rights has come the loss of important rights
traditionally attaching to individuals acting within mediating groups. The rights
of towns, for example, once provided an important vehicle for public freedom,
consisting of active participation by local citizens in basic decisions affecting
their lives; decisions that made one's individual autonomy actually matter, in
concrete practice, to one's life. As a result, at least since 1800, people in Amer-
ica have had a decreasing ability to control their own lives as they have ceded
participatory control to bureaucracies, capitalist managerial elites, and the trends
of utilitarian consumerism.
8 3
In part, as a result of our loss of understanding of group rights, we have
lost critical legal rights that historically protected people, both as individual per-
sons and in their social relationships. We have lost both protections against
potentially oppressive metastructures (freedom from, in Isaiah Berlin's phrase)
4
and aids to substantive participatory rights within groups (freedom to, in Ber-
lin's phrase). 85 And this loss of socially-based rights and rights discourse has
left modem society without the means to ground individuals and their rights in
institutions and practices harmonizing diverse interests while protecting individ-- 86
ual human beings from political oppression.
As to the danger of intolerant groups quashing individual autonomy,
Kathryn Abrams has pointed out that "[t]he plurality of local communities and
the possibility of exit diminish the [sic] both the likelihood and the impact of
so See Fort, supra note 36, at 395 (arguing that mediating institutions stand between the indi-
vidual and social metastructures, including the multinational corporation).
81 See MESSNER, supra note 68, at 472 (arguing that "[t]he particular right of the free associa-
tion to autonomy consists in the full right to frame its purpose and statute as long as the public
interest or the rights of others are not affected").
82 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1081 (1980).
93 Id. at 1086 n.340-47.
84 BERLIN, supra note 14, at 169 (describing negative liberties as follows: "I am normally said
to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political
liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others.").
85 Id. at 178 ("The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of
the individual to be his own master.. .I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and
enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that it is not.").
86 Nisbet, supra note 77, at 50 ("It is not liberty but chaos and license which... come to domi-
nate when moral and social authorities-those of family, neighborhood, local community, job, and
religion have lost their appeal to human beings.").
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coercive politics."' 87 Because local polities "control questions of citizenship and
inclusion over only a limited domain,"'88 citizens who find any particular local
polity oppressive, or even uncongenial, have a real opportunity to exit which,
while often involving hardship, nonetheless is more real and effective than that
provided by larger political units such as the nation state.
89
Key, then, to the safe and beneficial nature of mediating structures is
their small size. They are smaller, more diverse and less all-encompassing than
social metastructures, including the minority cultures espoused by multicultural-
ism, and so are both less likely to cause harmful exclusions and more likely to
spawn meaningful participation. 90  Thus, rather than according differing and
conflicting rights to various politicized groups, we can instead recognize the
rights inherent in more local, organic corporate groups within the local lives of
individual persons. Instead of stripping persons of any social relations with
rights and dignity, we can recognize that social lives are built through local at-
tachments, and that the groups formed by these attachments have their own in-
tegrity and inherent rights, without which individual persons themselves lose
positive rights as well as protections from the state. This would be consistent
with the historical groundings of the rights we seek to defend, with the practical
needs of individual persons as they face the erosion of autonomy by the state,
and with the rich, social nature of rights themselves.
IV. THE MEDIEVAL ROOTS OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP RIGHTS
To understand the inherent connection between individual and group
rights it is necessary to review the development of rights in the interaction of
individual and communal concerns central to medieval thought and practice.
Brian Tierney has pointed out the historical inaccuracy of the common claim
that philosophers created rights during the modem era. 91 He points out that
rights, understood as persons' rational, moral power to discern a sphere of
autonomy within which they could licitly act as they wished, can be found de-
veloped in the works of medieval Decretists whose views had been widely dif-
fused in the law schools of Europe by the end of the twelfth century. 92 Such
rights grew, not out of the pristine minds of philosophers, but out of the analysis
87 Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1606 (1988).
88 id. at 1605.
89 Id.
90 See generally Fort, supra note 36, at 395.
91 TIERNEY, supra note 66, 615-16 (1989) (arguing that contemporary theorists, who generally
place the origins of natural rights language somewhere in the seventeenth century, in large meas-
ure wrongly assume that any concept not present in the writings of Thomas Aquinas must not
have been extant during the medieval era).
92 Id. at 625.
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of texts, and especially of existing practices, conducted by canon lawyers and
commentators.
Some may reject the "purportedly objective assessment of the teachings
of natural law and the Christian religion" central to medieval juridical thought.
But medieval jurists forged a fertile theory and practice of human rights through
the integration of Roman and canon law within the confines of the communalist
society of medieval Europe.94 At the center of this integrative process was the
corporate group, itself an integrative institution which, as its name suggests,
incorporated various individuals into itself. As the groundbreaking historian of
medieval corporatism, Otto von Gierke, observed, the medieval view, the town,
for example, was seen as real in itself, unifying individuals with the group; this
is in contrast to the modem view, in which the corporation is seen as a fictional
person separate from the members.
95
Legal practice reflected the medieval, integrationist view. Rather than
bestowing limited liability on a corporation seen as utterly separate from a more
or less passive group of shareholders, the town, for example, was seen as being
possessed of a kind of joint and several liability. Each member of the corpora-
tion was liable for its acts, and this included citizen liability for the taxes of the
town.96 Yet, by the later fifteenth century, a charter which would now be con-
sidered a charter of incorporation did not bestow limited liability, yet still be-
stowed on the town the so-called five points of incorporation: the right to have
perpetual succession and a common seal; the right to sue and be sued; the right
to own property; and the right to issue bylaws-to have its own will, though one
for which corporate members were fully responsible.
9 7
Corporate entities, including municipalities, trade guilds and burial so-
cieties, were known in Roman law from the earliest times. But the Romans had
no theory of collective personality. 98 Moreover, Roman secular corporations
93 Helmholz, supra note 7, at 324. (contrasting the medieval, "objective" view of rights with
modern conceptions of rights as "grounded in conceptions of individual autonomy and human
worth").
94 Id. at 301-302 (supporting in general terms "a strand of revisionist scholarship" holding
that the origins of natural rights are to be found in "the amalgam of Roman and canon law that
governed European legal education up to the time of codification and controlled much of the legal
practice in the courts of church and state from the twelfth century to the eighteenth"); see also
Kenneth Pennington, The History of Rights in Western Thought, 47 EMoRY L.J. 237, 252 (1998)
(arguing that rights "have been a part of our discourse for eight centuries").
95 Frug, supra note 82, at 1089.
96 H. Ke Chin Wang, The Corporate Entity Concept (Or Fiction Theory) in the Year Book
Period, 58 LAW Q. REv. 498, 507-08 (1942).
97 SUSAN REYNOLDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWNS 113
(Clarendon Press 1977); see also FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, 1 THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 487 (Cambridge University Press 1968)
(1899) (pointing out that the non-liability of members was not essential to incorporation).
98 Corporations in 3 DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 606 (Joseph R. Strayer ed., 1982).
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survived the fall of the empire only in scattered and fragmentary form. Mean-
while the Christian church, suffering less interruption in its institutional continu-
ity, developed within itself a rich variety of corporate communities. 99 Thus, the
earliest true corporations were those of the Church and the constitutive groups
within it.
100
Charles Reid has pointed out that "the twelfth and thirteenth-century
Church was defined juristically as consisting at least in part of a network of cor-
porate entities."101 These entities, including dioceses, cathedral chapters, mon-
asteries and religious orders, were defined as corporations, governed through
members' consent and combining a web of individual rights with corporate exis-
tence. 
10 2
The rights of corporate groups and of their members were set forth, not
as part of the early modem rise of individualism, but in the laws of the Church
of which they were a part.t1 3 Canon law established a structure of rights gov-
erning individual persons and groups and controlling a wide variety of issues,
including: clerical exemptions from civil duties, taxes, prosecutions and forced
testimony; the ability of ecclesiastical organizations such as parishes, monaster-
ies and charities to form and disband, accept and reject members and acquire
and alienate property; and the ability of religious conformists to worship, evan-
gelize, maintain religious symbols, participate in the sacraments and educate
their children.1
04
While a significant portion of medieval canon law was put forth, sub-
stantively and procedurally, in the form of rights attaching to individuals, many
of these rights did not attach to individuals merely on account of their humanity;
they were not "natural" in the sense of being universally applicable. 105 Only the
99 JOHN P. DAvis, 1 CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT
BusiNEss COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 36-37 (1905);
see also 3 DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 606 (arguing that the development of the theory of
the corporation as a distinct institution began with Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis, culminating in
the Commentarius super libros quinque decretalium of Pope Innocent IV. However, the devel-
opment of an identifiable concept of the corporation is more clearly attributable to the commenta-
tors on the canons, the decretists and the decretalists.).
100 Id. at 236.
101 Charles Reid, Rights in Thirteenth-Century Canon Law: A Historical Investigation, 6,
(1995) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University)(on file with author).
102 Id. at 310-12 (arguing that medieval corporate structures had juridic personality, perpetuity,
a corporate seal and a common chest).
103 John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 18
(1996) ("Many of the common formulations of rights and liberties in vogue today were first
forged not by a John Locke or a James Madison, but by twelfth and thirteenth century canonists
and theologians.").
104 Id. at 17.
105 Helmholz, supra note 7, at 301 (discussing natural rights)("We hold some rights not simply
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Catholic faithful, specifically excluding Jews, Muslims and heretics, were ac-
corded many rights and protections, and even these rights were to be exercised
only within appropriate ecclesiastical limitations.l°6 This is not to say, however,
that only Christians were accorded rights in Europe during the middle ages. The
Catholic Church in particular recognized a series of universal-natural--rights
accruing to individuals independent of their stature within that Church.
10 7
Canon law "defined the rights of the poor, widows, and the needy to seek sol-
ace, succor, and sanctuary within the church." 10 8 Also defined were the rights
of spouses to claim sexual relations with their partners, and to protect this rela-
tionship from outsiders.1
09
Moreover, Christian religious thought emphasized the importance of the
individual person, focusing on individual intention in assessing guilt, individual
consent in marriage, and individual scrutiny of conscience. The medieval
view emphasized both corporatism and individualism, in part because it rested
on the assumption that people become fully human through social interaction,
rather than in isolation.1 1 Rights provided a neutral sphere of personal choice,
but the choice was to be exercised in the context of a requirement that individu-
als exert themselves to achieve moral improvement, which would benefit the
community as a whole. '
12
The individual/group dynamic was at the heart of medieval corporate
life. The corporation was conceived, neither as the mere extension of a ruler nor
as a mere temporary association of discrete individuals, "but as an organic union
of a head and members." 113 For example, under canon law, all Christians were
incorporated into the one Body of Christ (the Church). In the corporation of the
Church, the Pope's status as temporal head meant that he had more power than
each individual, but did not confer on him greater power than that of the whole
because the government of the day concedes them to us. We hold them because we are human.").
106 Witte, supra note 103, at 18.
107 Reid, supra note 101, at 72 ("It is simply not true that the medieval canonists lacked a con-
cept of universal rights.").
108 Witte, supra note 103, at 17-18; but see Helmholz, supra note 7, at 305-07 (arguing that
commentators disagreed over the nature and extent of the right to sustenance, with few holding it
actionable).
109 Reid, supra note 101, at 27. Another arguably universal right was that of lepers to many in
the Church, should they be able to find a willing spouse. See id. at 61.
10 TIERNEY, supra note 66, at 27.
i Id. at 169-70.
1t2 Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Medieval Origins of the Western Natural Rights Tradition: The
Achievement of Brian Tierney, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 437, 462 (1998).
113 TIERNEY, supra note 66, at 171.
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of the people. 114 As Tierney has argued: "Christian individualism was balanced
by this vision of the church as one body, united to Christ as head, a body in
which the members could help and sustain one another, spiritually through their
prayers, and corporally through works of charity."'
115
The Pope had rights on account of his position as head of the corporate
Church, including the right of holding the property of the Holy See (although in
a feudal context, so that he did not necessarily hold it in exclusive possession)
116
and the right to general supervision in case of necessity. 17 And the Pope had
the power to intervene in any local contentious process at any stage." 8 But the
Pope's rights were limited by the rights of others. Specifically, litigants had the
right to receive justice in the face of papal power; causes of action might be
deferred, but could not be denied. 119 The Pope also was limited by the corpo-
rate relationship, including by due process protections afforded those below him
in the hierarchy. The Pope could not intervene where cardinals or bishops were
exercising their rights without satisfying strict procedural safeguards. 12 More-
over, while the Pope could remove a cardinal from office, this required consent
of the entire assembly. 12 1 A cardinal could not be convicted of a crime without
the testimony of several witnesses.
122
As a college, the cardinals had the right to elect the Pope, through
means governed by procedural rules protecting individual cardinals' rights of
participation. 123  The cardinals had substantial say in the governance of the
Church; as bishops were required to get the consent of the cathedral chapter (the
body of clergy in their bishoprics, assigned as a group to help them govern)
124
114 See BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 90-
95 (1982) (arguing that the Great Schism spawned much writing to the effect that ultimate author-
ity in the church resided in the whole community, which could meet in a general council which
might have the power to depose even a pope).
115 Brian Tierney, Religion and Rights: A Medieval Perspective, 5 J. L. & RELIGION 163, 170
(1987).
116 Reid, supra note 101, at 322.
117 Id. at 321.
118 Id. at 351.
I9 Id. at 366.
120 Id. at 215-16, 356.
121 Id. at 377.
122 Id. at 378.
123 Id. at 395. The Cardinals constituted a group, drawing on a common, corporate treasurer's
chest. Id. at 401-02.
124 William H.W. Fanning, Chapter, in THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1908) ( indicating the
cathedral chapter had its own rules and interests, forming a separate body from the bishop that at
times opposed his will), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03582b.htm (last visited
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for certain functions, and the Pope was required to get the consent of the cardi-
nals for certain actions. In instances in which consent was required, failure to
receive it could lead to invalidation of the papal act.125 The unanimous consent
of the college was required for alienation of property that pertained to the
Church. 26  Further, cardinal-legates were empowered to exercise voluntary
jurisdiction over non-contentious cases, and to exercise jurisdiction over conten-
tious cases with local consent.
127
There were numerous other rights accruing to individuals as members of
corporate groups. The members of individual religious corporations possessed a
series of identifiable rights. 128 These rights depended, in nature and form, on
each person's status within the salient group. For example, the bishop had a
right to his cathedraticum, a fixed sum to be paid to him by the churches of his
diocese. 129 The cathedral canon held some rights in common with the other
members of the cathedral chapter, but also held individual rights, defensible at
law, such as that to his own prebend, or claim to receive revenue. 13  Bishops
had a right to visit, inquire, and impose punishment or correction upon monas-
teries as a whole or upon their individual members.131 The abbot of a monastery
was accorded monarchical powers over his monks, who were deemed "dead to
the law" of the secular realm, but who still enjoyed canonical protections and
whose interests were looked after by the monastery as a whole.132
Another example is provided by the cathedral chapter, members of
which had the right to vote for chapter officers, including the bishop.133 Mem-
bers also had the right to receive notice of elections. 34 Due process protections
were significant; an election might be voided where the rights of a single elector
were infringed. Where a member of a cathedral chapter had not been notified of
an election or otherwise was excluded from participation, he could not be com-
pelled to ratify the chapter's choice and was empowered to bring an action to
Aug. 15, 2004).
125 Reid, supra note 101, at 393-94.
126 Id. at 387.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 109.
129 Id. at 165-66.
130 Tierney, supra note 115, at 171.
131 Reid, supra note 101, at 197.
132 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 507; see id. at 504-07 (detailing rights and respon-
sibilities of medieval abbots).
133 Reid, supra note 101, at 310-12.
134 Id. at 170-71.
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invalidate it.135 However, where an elector did not wish to participate, the col-
lege was free to proceed without him, and the right of election could be lost
through misconduct or lack of use.
136
Although the right of election has been seen as a precursor of the more
modem notion of a generalized right to vote, it was, in its origins, a link between
individuals and the groups of which they were members. 137 Tierney has shown,
however, that this era produced generalized arguments concerning the right of
the people to consent to their government. 138 It also is important to note that the
corporate character of the Catholic Church's organization was reproduced in
other groups, spawning a plethora of rights accruing to individuals on account of
their corporate membership. 139 One important such group was the municipality
or, more specifically in England, the borough.
V. BOROUGHS, CORPORATIONS AND THE ENGLISH CHARTER TRADITION
Two related areas on which the canon law had a significant impact were
municipal rights and the charter tradition. 140 English common law was suffused
with canonist, corporatist assumptions, and forms.14  Thus, it is not surprising
that one may find secular bodies analogous to ecclesiastical corporate bodies;
such was the English borough. Boroughs are difficult to define in medieval
usage and difficult to differentiate from other population centers. 142 We know,
however, that boroughs had certain characteristics that enhanced their impor-
tance and communal character; with their roots in earlier royal military en-
135 Id. at 272.
136 Id. at 276.
137 Helmholz, supra note 7, at 311-12 ("ITjhe modem law of elections can be traced back to
the system the medieval eanonists developed for choosing bishops, abbots, and many humbler
offices within the church." However, Hostiensis "one of the most prominent of the thirteenth
century canonists," argued that the true purpose of the voting right was the production of correct
choices-picking the right person to serve the group, rather than fostering individual autonomy).
138 TIERNEY, supra note 114, at 22.
139 DAviS, supra note 99, at 237.
140 See generally R. H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the lus Commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 297
(1999) (tracing the key elements and generalized form of the Magna Carta to the continental in-
corporation of canon and civil law).
141 See generally William W. Bassett, Canon Law and the Common Law, 29 HASTINGS L. J.
1383 (1978) (summarizing the varied influences of canon law on the development of English
common law).
142 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 642 (arguing that "in the thirteenth [century] no
strict definition of a borough was possible").
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campments, boroughs enjoyed greater self-government, representation and cor-
porate existence than other localities in medieval England.
By the thirteenth century, the English borough could be likened to a re-
ligious order because it had "a permanent purpose that keeps it together[;] just
as a religious house is kept together by the purpose of glorifying God[;]" a
freeman of Norwich, for example, would take as his civil purpose to protect the
franchises and liberties of that borough. 144 Medieval English boroughs devel-
oped corporate personality; their lands and affairs belonged to the group, rather
than simply to individuals. 14 5 "In the second place, the administrators for the
time being are a legally organized body, a body which perdures while its mem-
bers come and go. [Finally] this body transacts business as a body by means
of meetings and votings and resolutions; the motive power is not ... the will of a
single man."
' 147
England itself was conceived as a corporation with the king as head,
limited in his rights by the corporate, law-bound nature of his relationship with
his subjects and the doctrine of ultra vires1t48 Indeed, Pollock and Maitland
note that the same interaction of individual and communal rights as that shown
in canon law was prevalent in English law: "Every right, every duty, however
communal its character, spontaneously becomes the right, the duty, of an indi-
vidual by attaching itself to the land that he holds."
149
As bishops were not mere creatures of the Pope, secular corporations in
the medieval era were not mere creatures of the king. Charters, or "formal
documents describing the rights and obligations on each side of a feudal rela-
143 Id. at 634-38 (by the time of the Conquest, the borough was "a unit," it already had corpo-
rate personality and so had to be dealt with as a unit rather than as a collection of vassals). See
also J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 73 (1992) (arguing that "[a] borough was a distinct and easily
comprehended entity; there was no difficulty in accepting that it held corporate privilege. A shire
was not so easy to imagine in this role. ").
144 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 686. Norwich here is referred to as a "city" but
Pollock and Maitland point out that this is merely another term for a borough, one usually but not
uniformly applied to a borough with its own cathedral. See id. at 634. Pollock and Maitland draw
most directly the parallel between church and borough, placing both in the category "corpora-
tions." Id. at 635.
145 Id. at 507-08; see also id at 502 (in the canonist era both theory and practice held that cor-
porations could commit crimes and/or torts).
146 Id. at 508 (citations omitted).
147 Id.
148 Eric Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitu-
tional Government, WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 7-8 (2001). See also id. at 8 ("[The] corporate law
doctrine of ultra vires, at least theoretically, prevented the king's personal acts from becoming an
act of his corporate or political capacity when they violated the laws which created his office.");
see id. at 6 (stating that both Blackstone and Henry VIII argued that England was a corporation
with head and members, and its laws could be changed only by the combination of the two).
149 POLLOCK & MAiTLAND, supra note 97, at 688.
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tionship" 150 were common means by which both kings and lesser lords granted
privileges (for a price) to burgesses or local borough leaders. 15 1 Charters from
the crown played an important role in establishing corporations and their laws;
during the medieval era, "[g]radually English law came to view charter grants as
grants of corporate status." 52 By 1200 boroughs were receiving seals with their
charters, which their heads used to commit the whole in conducting business.
153
But, as Pollock and Maitland note, the idea that a corporation must be created by
the sovereign was a fourteenth century innovation driven by "political expedi-
ence and financial needs." 154 Medieval corporations could be formed by act of
Parliament, prescription, or common law.155 Thus charters were not the sole
source of borough rights, but rather a particularly clear and enforceable state-
ment of corporate rights, providing specific terms rather than usage or custom to
interpret.
That the Magna Carta is central to any discussion of chartered rights is
self-evident. 156 But important to note is that the Great Charter was not unique.
Other monarchs at this time and even earlier were granting charters of liberties
to their realms, in whole or in part. 57 Moreover, Magna Carta was part of a
long practice by which kings and nobles granted privileges and liberties of
widely differing degree and kind to particular groups and individuals within
150 Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal
Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 378 (1985) (citing M. BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY, at 148-49 (L.A.
Manyon trans., 1964)).
151 REYNOLDS, supra note 97, at 135 (Burgesses were those wealthy enough to have paid bor-
ough dues).
152 Williams, supra note 150, at 381.
153 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 683.
154 Id. at 669-670 ("[Guilds] may give trouble; .... Besides, here lies a not disreputable source
of income.").
155 JOSEPH S. DAVIS, 1 ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 2-3
(1917).
156 Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIs. L. REV. 941, 948 (stating that
the "ancestry of the due process clause is universally traced to chapter 39 of Magna Carta"). One
potential complication arises from the fact that charters of liberties or privileges-even those
drafted as late as were American colonial charters-seldom used the term "rights." James H.
Hutson, The Emergence of the Modern Concept of a Right in America: The Contribution of Mi-
chel Villey, 39 AM. J. JUms. 185, 187-88 (1994). But this article follows a well-worn line of ar-
gument (see id. at 188 and citations therein) to the effect that these charters did in fact confer
"rights" - rights which developed from the fact of increased autonomy granted by charter and
developed through procedural safeguards within corporate groups. As Holt argues, charters of
liberties were but one step in the "long tortuous and often bloody journey" "to a settled constitu-
tion." HOLT, supra note 143 at 23.
157 HOLT, supra note 143, at 25-26 (listing monarchs on the continent during this era who had
granted charters of liberties to all or parts of their realms); see also id. at 36-38 (noting similarities
and distinctions between Magna Carta and Henry I's Charter of Liberties (promulgated in 1100)).
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their demesnes: The English monarchs' reliance on sales of charters, increasing
quickly in the reigns soon after the conquest of 1066, produced demands for
more liberties, and for more generalized rights, eventually culminating in the
rebellion that produced Magna Carta. t58 That document declared a number of
rights attaching to individual barons and others that are credited with a crucial
role in the development of individual rights, and due process rights in particu-
lar) 59 In addition, however, it was the product of a communalist society that
took the rights of groups, including boroughs, very seriously. Indeed, "Magna
Carta owed much to the precedent of municipal privilege." As Pollock and
Maitland point out, Magna Carta was a grant of "certain liberties" by King John
to the men of England "as he had granted them to the men of Cornwall and the
men of London," that is, as a corporate charter for a borough.
161
The Magna Carta expanded upon common elements of borough charters
including freedom to trade, free access to markets, individuals' marriage rights
and limitations on taxes and feudal rights of lordship.162 During the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, London in particular had won pledges from a succession of
monarchs to support municipal liberties. 163 By the thirteenth century more rural
areas also had begun negotiating for charter rights, including the right to de-
velop royal lands and to control the office of sheriff. 164 Control over one's sher-
iff could entail many specific charter rights, including the right to have a spe-
cific person in that office, procedural limits on the sheriff's activities, and the
right of dismissal for misbehavior.
165
Borough rights were sought for the sake of both the borough itself and
of the boroughs' citizens. Medieval boroughs sought corporate freedom from
external interference, including the freedom of individual citizens from servi-
tude to external lords. 166 Many rights accruing to borough members were de-
158 Id. at 50-51.
159 See, e.g., Tierney, supra note 115, at 174 (stating that, because of Magna Carta, "the whole
existing political order was now being defined as a structure of rights," which would expand to
include all people, including through adaptation of notions of "law of the land" to current rights of
due process).
160 HOLT, supra note 143, at 55.
161 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 674.
162 HOLT, supra note 143, at 57-59.
163 Id. at 56-57; see also REYNOLDS, supra note 97, at 109 (arguing "Magna Carta not only
confirmed the liberties and free customs of cities, boroughs, towns (ville) and ports (portas), but,
by its reference to the aids (auxilia) of London, implied that London-though not the other towns-
was exempt from tallage").
164 HOLT, supra note 143, at 60-62.
165 Id. at 62.
166 REYNOLDS, supra note 97, at 100.
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pendent on their status. For example, burgesses gained important rights such as
that of being tried by a jury of local persons, in the borough court rather than in
the court of the local lord. 7 Burgesses also gained some of the rights normally
accruing to the local sheriffs, such as that to tolls, rents and court profits.1
68
Other rights accrued to all within the borough, such as freedom from attachment
of one's chattels by another borough. 1
69
Important rights were held by the borough as a corporation, such as
freedom from personal service 170 as well as rights of self government. While
boroughs could not officially pass new legislation unless such right was specifi-
cally granted by the king, such powers did evolve; among the earliest local laws
was a building code for the city of London, the grounds for which developed
from the recognized right to declare and follow local custom. 171 Boroughs also
held numerous economic rights rooted in local control. These economic rights
included that of maintaining borough monopolies on various goods,172 as well
as freedom from certain taxes and feudal incidences.17 3 These rights spurred
development of further corporate groups and rights rooted in the medieval
guilds, which were separate from the boroughs and maintained their own
courts.' 74 Indeed, part of the reason boroughs came to need charters, rather than
relying on prescription for their rights, was the plethora of other associations
gaining chartered liberties during this period.
175
Key to boroughs' liberty-both positive and negative-was their securing
the right to appoint their own officials and thereby control their own internal
affairs. Grants of the "farm of the borough" made citizens corporately responsi-
ble for the annual royal dues, and transferred to them the right to appoint the
reeve who accounted to the crown for payment. 176 Over the medieval era, bor-
oughs also purchased rights to appoint their own bailiffs or tax collectors, coro-
ners to oversee the bailiffs, and local judges and mayors. 177 With these rights, a
167 POLLOCK & MAITLAND supra note 97, at 643-44. The King's jurisdiction was not, however,
eliminated. Id.
168 Id. at 650-51. Certain responsibilities came with burgesses' corporate leadership - chiefly
joint and several liability for the borough's debts. Id. at 655.
169 Id. at 675.
170 Id. at 664-65.
171 Id. at 660-61.
172 Id. at 664-65.
173 HOLT, supra note 143, at 57-59.
174 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 667.
175 Id. at 669-70.
176 REYNOLDS, supra note 97, at 102-03.
177 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 656-57.
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majority of the borough corporation members could act for the whole, with each
individual member exercising rights of control through the group. 
178
Most important among local officials was the mayor. Unlike reeves and
bailiffs who, while appointed by the citizens, still had financial and administra-
tive responsibilities to the king, mayors were purely urban officials and as such
symbolized the borough's unity. The mayor filled in the borough a role
analogous to that of the Pope in the Church and heads of other ecclesiastical
bodies.180 As the head of the corporate group of the borough, the mayor was the
nexus of individual and group rights. Individual burgesses had the right to
choose their mayor; the mayor as an individual had the right to exercise the
powers of his office; and the borough as a corporate body had the right to act
through the mayor, to be free from interference from lords and even from the
king in areas protected by the charter, and to control their common destiny in
terms of legal proceedings, economic activity and everyday, customary rela-
tions.
VI. DUE PROCESS AND THE BOROUGH
There are deep connections between corporate rights developed in bor-
ough charters and the rights of individuals, including such "natural" rights as
that to due process. Magna Carta gave rights to trial according to "the law of
the land." 181 Local borough citizens had the right to appeal to the king on the
grounds that local laws and procedures were unfair. 182 Moreover, the enforce-
able, legal status of charters brought the king under the law and established
norms according to which every person had a right to the enforcement of his or
her rights-to a process by which they might enforce rights gained through char-
ter or usage.
It was the English ability to keep their monarch within the confines of
corporate office that allowed them to prevent establishment of the personal ab-
solutism of other monarchs, such as France's Louis XIV. 18 3 As Tocqueville
observed, the French kings took it upon themselves to curtail, sell, resell and
178 Wang, supra note 96, at 507.
179 REYNOLDS, supra note 97, at 109.
180 JAMES TAIT, THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH BOROUGH 255 (1936).
181 See MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in HOLT, supra note 143, at 461 ("No free man
shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we
go or send against him, except by the lawful [judgment] of his peers or by the law of the land.").
182 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 661.
183 Enlow, supra note 148, at 6 (stating that the French monarch managed to establish rights as
a personal sovereign that absorbed his corporate office, thus establishing himself as an absolute
ruler).
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finally abolish towns' charter rights in pursuit of personal power and money.184
The English king's power in this area was limited in that rights granted in perpe-
tuity could be revoked only for lack of exercise or cause. 85 Guarantees to all
persons were inviolable in England; every person had the rights accorded him or
her in any relevant charter or usage, and these rights were vindicated, most dra-
matically in the exit from power of King James II in 1688. When James at-
tempted to abuse the power to revoke charters through quo warranto proceed-
ings he was forced to abandon the attempt even before losing his throne.1
86
Quo warranto is a common law writ used to inquire into the authority
by which a public office is held or a franchise claimed. 87 It had been used early
on by the King as a tool of arbitrary revocation. However, it soon became an
instrument of due process. Its development in important ways was the devel-
opment of the rights of both groups and individual persons. By establishing
due process as a norm in charter proceedings it reinforced the developing right
to proceedings according to usage or the law of the land as well.
Perhaps the most significant development of the writ of quo warranto
took place during the reign of Edward 1 (1272-1307). Edward carried out a gen-
eral inquiry into local franchises and governmental conduct. 188 "Claimants were
to appear before them [itinerant judges riding in circuit], and if it was found that
they actually held any franchise, a writ of Quo Warranto would be served on
them, requiring them to show by what warrant they claimed to have the liberty
of wreck, or gallows, or view of frankpledge, or return of writs, or whatever it
might be."' 8 9 The use of the writ was nothing new. In fact, Edward's father,
Henry III, used quo warranto, and there are records indicating it was used as far
back as the reign of Richard I (1189-1199).190
What set Edward's use of quo warranto apart from his predecessors'
was his widespread, general exercise of the writ. Previously kings had, either by
unilateral action or writ of quo warranto, revoked charters or warrants known to
184 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 62, at 42. This is not to say that all grants of charter rights were
permanent, many required repeated confirmation; see HOLT, supra note 143, at 71-72.
185 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 667-668.
1s6 Lois SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689 9-18 (1981) (stating that James'
attack on borough charters, part of his attempt to pack Parliament with supporters, sparked intense
opposition, not assuaged by his rescinding of relevant orders, and was an important grievance
leading to his downfall, and to constitutional reforms in England); see also Frug, supra note 82, at
1092-1094 (pointing out that Charles Il's quo warranto proceeding against London, the most
important of cities, actually succeeded, but that the court decision affirming the king's right to
revoke the charter was reversed after the Glorious Revolution of 1688).
197 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1264 (7
th ed. 1999).
198 HELEN M. CAM, LIBERTIES AND COMMUNITIES IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, 173 (1963).
189 Id. (emphasis added).
190 Id. at 174.
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them to exist; under Edward, the inquiry was a general one into all exercises of
franchises. 19 1 If the party answered the writ successfully the franchise was
maintained. If not, the putative franchise was confiscated by the crown.
Edward rarely abolished anyone's franchise; such was not the goal.
192
The usual result of an adverse ruling for the subject in quo warranto was the
imposition of a substantial fine that was followed by the granting of a royal
charter. ' 9 3 Besides revenue, then, what did Edward seek? Not franchises' revo-
cation, but rather their proper definition, along with recognition of their revoca-
bility for misuse.
If the abbot of St. Albans had the right to appoint his own coroner for
the liberty of St. Albans, he took on himself the responsibility for seeing that the
coroner's rolls were duly kept, and that the coroner was available when re-
quired; when these conditions were not fulfilled the king took back the privilege
and appointed a coroner himself.
194
One crucial, though perhaps unintentional, by-product of Edward's ag-
gressive program was a partial fulfillment of Magna Carta: establishment of due
process rights in the guarantee of "each man's own liberty, warranted by a char-
ter, upheld in the courts."195 This due process went so far as to show that the
king, as a person, was not above the law. When Earl Warenne was called to
defend his Stamford charter in Lincolnshire, he claimed that Edward himself
had granted his charter. Edward's attorneys asserted the defense that, prior to
becoming king, Edward had himself usurped the liberties in question and, there-
fore, had no power to grant them.196 Further, the charters themselves, and thus
the king's powers, by the sixteenth century at the latest were deemed incapable
of either changing the common law or altering the rights and duties of private
191 Id. at 175 ("[Flrom 1254 onwards the justices in eyre, as part of their ordinary routine work,
were charged to inquire into the assumption of liberties without warrant.").
192 Id. at 180-181 (observing that Edward "was far from wishing to do away with private juris-
dictions and have all the work of local government done by royal officials alone").
193 Id. at 180.
194 Id. at 207. They continue: "All through the reign the juries of the countryside were being
invited to tell the king's justices in eyre what they knew of persons who had had liberties granted
to them and had used them otherwise than the grant prescribed". Id.; see also id. at 181 (stating
that what Edward "wanted was to get down in black and white what rights his subjects might
lawfully claim, and to assert in an unmistakable manner the principle that they held these rights
from him and only so long as they exercised them to the good of the realm").
195 Id. at 183.
196 Id. at 176 ("In Lincolnshire (1281) he claims return of writs and other liberties in Stamford,
under a charter given him by Edward himself in 1263. The king's counsel points out that the
liberties in question had been unlawfully usurped by Edward himself when he was lord of Stam-
ford, and that he, being, as he was then, a private person, had no power to grant usurped liberties;
as he has no other warrant, the earl loses these franchises.").
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persons as fixed by that law. 197 Charters were part of, rather than in some sense
trumps against, the common law. Indeed, during the earlier parts of the medie-
val era, towns without charters were treated little differently from those with
such charters. 198 Thus, municipal rights even outside the borough were real and
respected as part of the "law of the land" insisted upon in Magna Carta. Custom
or usage, the basis of the common law, was not mere tradition, but right; it es-
tablished what process was due, and even what actions, what sphere of auton-
omy, was to be protected by that process.
But charters served a crucial role in fixing the bounds of rights and
process. Those who exercised their rights in ways inconsistent with the terms of
grant or usage would have those rights abolished-but not without proper defini-
tion and inquiry. It is significant, here, that the finders of fact were countryside
juries working with itinerant justices and not the king's own household.' 99 The
result was increasingly objective enforcement of rights, along with their objec-
tive limits.
200
Rights, then, were real, though they could be revoked for abuse. A right
increasingly was defensible at law, liable to abolition only for cause and through. 201
proper procedures. Thus, it seems clear that even the more obviously "ac-
quired" rights of persons with a given status (such as a borough's mayor) also
was "inalienable" in the sense that it could be revoked only for cause and
brought with it the guarantee of procedural safeguards. The right was no abso-
lute trump, but rather a provider of a sphere of licit activities, of power and
autonomy within the confines of the common good.202 It is no wonder, then,
that the charter of incorporation has been called "the nucleus of British self-
government. ' 2°3 Boroughs and, later, American townships, were key centers ofright-holding, of licit autonomy.
197 W.S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16"h and 17" Centuries, 31 YALE L.J.
382, 392 (1922).
198 Wang, supra note 96, at 499; see also id. at 500 (noting that during the yearbook period
members of corporate groups could be held jointly and severally liable for debts of the group even
without a formal charter of incorporation).
199 CAM, supra note 188, at 207.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Philip Hamburger Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J.
907, 908 (1993) (stating that "natural rights were circumscribed by their very character as natural
rights" and by natural law).
203 MARTN WEINBAUM, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS xxvii-iii (1943) (discussing the ways in
which the charter of incorporation's elasticity allowed town oligarchies to take on more responsi-
bilities as they learned the ways of self-government, and also allowed self-government to spread
out from these oligarchies); see also TIERNEY, supra note 66, at 171-72. (Arguing the vast exten-
sion of civil liberties that occurred in the twelfth century came through the grant of charters of
rights to corporate communities, churches, boroughs and cities for instance; but often the rights
[Vol. 107
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VII. EARLY MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
Boroughs and ecclesiastical organizations were not the only corporate
right-holders in medieval England. Business corporations were unusual, but the
guilds formed out of the boroughs asserted economic rights to autonomy that
would grow through the early modem era. Guilds were identified closely with
the borough. Charters might "enforce guild regulations and monopolies... and
could give the town a trading monopoly in its county." 20 4 Guilds enjoyed sub-
stantial rights of the borough, including freedom from toll, because the often
were seen as themselves representing their local municipal corporation.
20 Z
Business corporations seen as separate entities from the geographically
based borough/merchant guilds were slow to develop. The first large business
corporations in England were the quasi-governmental foreign trading compa-
nies, which were granted the privilege to explore, colonize, and trade in particu-
lar geographic areas. 206 These corporations were created either by royal charter
or by special act of Parliament.20 7 An example of these trading companies is the
still viable Hudson Bay Company which was granted a royal charter in 1670.208
Companies chartered for such commercial activities nonetheless mixed eco-
nomic with colonizing and governmental functions; the Jamestown (Virginia)
and Massachusetts Bay Companies, for example, ran colonial governments,
enforcing laws and providing local administration, as well as conducting
trade.
20 9
Thus, trading companies resembled boroughs in their mixed politi-
cal/social/economic nature, though trading companies' activities and sphere of
autonomy were significantly larger. Trading companies' growth came about at
were of a kind that could actually be exercised only by individuals, e.g. the right of a merchant to
come and go freely. Earlier medieval society had certainly recognized individual rights, espe-
cially feudal rights, but there was nothing liberal or egalitarian about them. A baron's right was
typically an exemption from royal jurisdiction, a right to dominate others. One of the most cher-
ished of feudal rights was the right to have a gallows. But when rights or liberties, exemptions
from official meddling in certain areas of life, began to be granted to corporate communities, they
took on a new tone and quality and became diffused through much broader classes of the popula-
tion. From the twelfth century onward thousands of urban communities acquired such rights
through purchase or negotiation or sometimes outright rebellion-rights like freedom from arbi-
trary taxation and arbitrary arrest, freedom from servile dues, the right to be tried by one's own
townfolk in a local town court, and the right to elect a mayor and other city officials. This was
rich soil where later more generalized theories of civil rights would take root and grow.).
204 REYNOLDS, supra note 97, at 102.
205 Id. at 102.
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the time of, and perhaps reinforced, growing suspicion of corporate groups
among those at the center of English power. By the sixteenth century it was
assumed that the creation of a corporation required the sanction of the state,
though such was not openly stated until 1682, in a suit against the London char-210
ter. Over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there developed a theory of
corporate purpose according to which each corporation was limited in its licit
actions to those taken in furtherance of the purpose for which it was created.
211
This ultra vires doctrine, which was applied to boroughs as well as business
corporations, was justified as a means by which the sovereign could limit the
assumed rights of corporations-those which corporate groups did not enjoy on
account of their charter, but which were deemed necessary for carrying out their212
purpose. Also during this period outside controls over corporate groups in-
creased through regularization of the role of the visitor in ecclesiastical corpora-
tions and those, such as charitable hospitals, formed to carry out the will of a
founding grantor.2 13 Such measures merely added to Parliamentary actions be-
ginning in the fifteenth century, which gave justices of the peace oversight of
ordinances instituted by guilds and similar bodies such as crafts and fratemi-
ties.
2 14
During the early modem era there grew significant limits on the rights
of corporate groups. Moreover, the spread of municipal rights was eliminated
sometime before the eighteenth century, when new borough incorporation
ceased. 2 15 With shifts in population came the problem of "rotten" or under
populated boroughs, which local lords might control along with Parliamentary
elections, even as great cities grew up in areas not possessed of charters, andS216
hence corporate rights and Parliamentary representation. Nonetheless, the
corporate form was too well established to be abolished, and customary, sub-
stantial rights of self-government continued. In addition, the early modem era
saw a great expansion of corporate rights rooted in the common law; rights in-
timately connected with economic life, but deeply impacting social and political
life as well through their incorporation in guilds, business companies and the
companies responsible for settling the new world.
210 Holdsworth, supra note 197, at 383.
211 Id. at 386.
212 See id. at 396-97.
213 See id. at 394-95.
214 See id. at 395.
215 Williams, supra note 150, at 392.
216 Timothy P. Brennan, Cleaning out the Augean Stables: Pennsylvania 's Most Recent Redis-
tricting and a Call to Clean up this Messy Process, 13 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 250 (2003)
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VIII. MUNICIPAL RIGHTS IN AMERICA
The American colonies were settled by people with deep respect for and
attachment to corporate groups.2 17  This allowed for both local diversity and
certain overarching similarities. Virginia and Massachusetts, both chartered,
corporated colonies, were very different in important ways. First, Massachu-
setts settlers considered it important to form themselves, through the Mayflower
Compact, into a "civil body politick," a society dedicated to living a Godly life.
218 Both, however, began and were for decades treated as corporations, with
wide latitude for self-government. 219 The colonies took full advantage of this
latitude, 220 and of their isolated state, in exercising their local autonomy, gov-
erning themselves and making their own laws not inconsistent with the laws of
England.
221
The law of corporations developed in England was brought directly to
America and applied here. Thus, prior to the American Revolution the corpo-
rate charters of cities such as New York City were regarded as "inviolate grants
of privilege and property not subject to the whim of legislative or royal author-
217 See generally Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The Sanctity of Association: The Corporation and
Individualism in American Law, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 101, 116-21 (2000) (discussing early
Americans' reverence for the group).
218 See Donald S. Lutz, Religious Dimensions in the Development of American Constitutional-
ism, 39 EMORY L.J. 21, 25 (1990) ("We can note several foundation elements contained within
[the Mayflower Compact (1620)). First, God is called in as a witness to the agreement: 'In the
Name of our Lord Jesus Christ.. . .' Second, it explains why the agreement is necessary: to create
a church in the wilderness to support their living together in a manner 'as becometh all those
whom He hath Redeemed, & Sanctifyed to Himself. . . .' Third, it creates a people: 'We whose
names are hereunder written ... .' Fourth, it creates a church. Fifth, it defines the kind of people
they wish to become -- a people who walk in the ways of the Gospels, God's ordinances, and in
mutual love."); see also id. at 26 (noting that the Pilgrim Code of Law (1636) re-stated the May-
flower Compact).
219 Id. at 30 (describing elements of colonial charters) ("More often than not, the sixth element
took the form of establishing an oversight council in England, but empowering the colonists to
handle all collective decisions on their own, including civil and criminal matters.").
220 Id. at 32-33 (noting that in Connecticut, this latitude was so broad that political leaders
needed only to delete references to the King to transform the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut
(1639) into the Connecticut Constitution); see also id. (noting that the Fundamental Orders of
Connecticut, drafted by the colonists, was adopted by the King after the restoration of Charles 11
in 1660 as the Connecticut Charter of 1662). Likewise, Massachusetts and Rhode Island used
their pre-revolution charters as their state constitutions. The other ten states wrote new constitu-
tions, but these "largely brought forward their colonial institutions and political principles." Id. at
22, 35.
221 See id. at 23 (During the early colonial period settlers were "usually under the nominal
control of a board of directors in London, the grant of local control, the impossibility of running
any colony from London given the distance involved, and the preoccupation in England with the
English Civil War gave the settlers considerable latitude in running their own affairs.").
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ity. ' '222 But these charters had been granted by the crown; the vast majority of
American municipalities lacked charters. This did not, however, keep unchar-
tered municipalities from acting and being treated as important corporate
groups, with rights analogous to those of English boroughs. 223
Moreover, soon after colonization began, so did broad grants of power
from colonial governments to their municipalities. The first "Town Act" was
passed in 1636, granting powers far broader than those granted to lesser munici-
palities in England.224 These acts "were broad, open-ended mandates for the
town meeting to manage local business. ' 225 Local popular sovereignty was so
widespread and valued in colonial America that townspeople resisted chartered
incorporation for fear they would thereby lose control of the town.2 2 6 Towns
exercised significant authority in America, and townspeople held significant
rights; particularly in New England, where the town meeting enabled them to
vote directly on matters of economics, taxation, health, education and morals;
and where early constitutional documents defined the powers of local elected
officials as essentially executive functions designed to carry out the will of the
town meeting. 227 Before the revolution, New England towns already had estab-
lished a pattern of government in which delegates were sent to the colonial leg-
islature to represent their towns' interests; rather than the towns deriving their
legitimacy from grants by the colony, the colonial government derived its le-
228
gitimacy from local assemblies. The reality of local rights spawned the view
that, as Tocqueville put it, whereas the state and nation are creations of man,
"townships seem to spring directly from the hand of God." 
2 2 9
Not all Americans were fond of townships and their rights, especially
after the revolution had separated America from England. James Madison, for
222 Jon C. Teaford, The Birth of a Public Corporation, 83 MICH. L. REv. 690, 690 (1985).
223 See Williams, supra note 150, at 370-71; see also WILLIAM BENNETr MUNRO, THE
GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIEs 21 (4th ed. 1926) ("[The] American system of municipal
government did not originate in America; it was borrowed from England").
224 Williams, supra note 150, at 412.
225 Id. at 413 (quoting Lockridge & Krieder, The Evolution of Massachusetts Town Govern-
ment, 1640 to 1740, 23 WM. & MARY Q 549, 550-51 (1966)).
226 See id.; see also Frug, supra note 82, at 1096 (noting that Charles Town, South Carolina
successfully resisted incorporation, while the corporation of Philadelphia became over time a mere
club with its powers superceded by special commissions and associations).
227 Dorchester Agreement 1633, reprinted in Dorchester Town Records: Fourth Report of the
Record Commissioners 3 (Rockwell and Churchill, City Printers, 1880) (setting up a local repre-
sentative body to carry out the will of the local town meeting, which predated it).
228 Joseph P. Viteritti, Municipal Home Rule and the Conditions of Justifiable Secession, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1995).
229 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 62, at 62.
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example, articulated in Federalist 10 his view of the negative impact on society
to which majority rule could lead to, stating:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties
and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the
same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing
a majority... the more easily will they concert and execute their
plans of oppression. 3 °
Others during this period expressed mistrust for "municipal charters as
perpetuating special privileges in derogation of the recently established republi-
can form of government." 231 Nonetheless, the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 not only recognized towns' claims to self-government, but also went fur-
ther, "tacitly likening Massachusetts itself to the smaller corporations within
it.,,232
Madison's view would win out as municipal rights came to be seen as
rooted in an individualistic notion of self-government, according to which gov-
ernment itself "was nothing more than 'a voluntary association of individuals:..
. a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for
the common good.' 233 Thus, both the corporation and the state increasingly
came to be seen as mere aggregations of individuals. 234 Within a few decades
of the revolution the "self' in "self government" increasingly came to mean the
individual to the exclusion of the township or other corporate group.2
35
There seems an unbridgeable gulf between early practice, including
early American practice, in regard to municipal rights and the current situation.
Where once towns had rights granting them wide latitude in local governance
and important immunities from state and federal action, today municipalities are
considered mere administrative units of their states. They are allowed to exer-
cise only those powers delegated to them by the state, taxing only as allowed by
both state and federal limits; are forbidden from economic activities beyond
operation of local, nonprofit public utilities; and are subject to all but absolute
230 Charles W. Goldner, Jr., Home Rule School Districts: An Opportunity for Meaningful Re-
form or Simple Window Dressing?, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 255, 268 (1997) (quoting The Federalist No.
10 (James Madison)).
231 Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmen-
tal/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REv. 277, 300 (1990).
232 O'Melimn, supra note 217, at 126.
233 Id. (quoting THE MASS. CONST. OF 1780, reprinted in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 441 (Oscar Handlin
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state control. 236 Even formerly local activities related to health and education
are carried out or thoroughly regulated by larger governmental units.2 37 As Joan
C. Williams notes, "although borough corporations exercised a broad range of
both public and private powers and were substantially immune from state sover-
eignty, their modem American counterparts, municipal corporations, are purely
public entities subject to the will of the sovereign states."
23 8
But while the gap between current and former practice may be un-
bridgeable, that to understanding is not. The very individualism regnant in talk
of "popular sovereignty" soon undid the nexus of rights constructed over many
centuries as it spawned hostility toward mediating groups thought to infringe
individual choice. Key to this development was a distinction key to modem• • 239
liberal ideology: that between public and private spheres of action.
American municipalities lost their rights in large measure because
judges and legislators during the early republican period could not or would not
understand and accept their mixing of economic, social and political functions.
Early on, there was a demand that municipal corporations be defined as either
public or private. In the end, the public classification won out, and municipali-
ties were subordinated utterly to the states.
240
Thus the loss of municipal rights had its origins in the very body of
thought often looked to as the source of individual rights. Social contract and
other individualist thinkers in the early modern era, including Hobbes and
Grotius, opposed medieval corporate groups as obstacles in the way of individ-
ual freedom and state efficiency. 241 Gerald Frug characterizes James II's late-
seventeenth century suit seeking to subordinate the city of London to his rule as
a struggle between the Hobbesian view that a municipal charter was a state in-
terest and the Lockean view that it was an individual right; the King's (Hobbe-
sian) view won out, but neither side any longer grasped the older reality of a
municipal charter as recognition of a group incorporating its members rather
236 Frug, supra note 82, at 1062-65.
237 Id. at 1065.
238 Williams, supra note 150, at 370-71; see also Frug, supra note 82, at 1119-20 ("[The] city
has changed from an association promoted by a powerful sense of community and an identifica-
tion with the defense of property to a unit that threatens both the members of the community and
their property . . . .It is not simply that cities have become totally subject to state control - al-
though that itself demonstrates their powerlessness - but also that cities have lost the elements of
association and economic strength that had formerly enabled them to play an important part in the
development of Western society.").
239 Frug, supra note 82, at 1065-67; see also id. at 1080 (arguing that city powerlessness is
merely one aspect of liberal hostility to all intermediate groups between the state and the individ-
ual).
240 See id. at 1076.
241 Id. at 1088-89.
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than standing utterly outside of them.242 As Frug notes, the London case was
reversed by the Revolution of 1688 and its opposing interests mollified by the
political victory of a locally-based Parliament. Nonetheless, a crucial set of
beliefs and practices was being lost: that of charters as particular grants within a
common law tradition rooting rights in custom and usage, and in a tradition,
wherein corporate groups like the township exercised significant autonomy.
Soon after the revolution, American courts began distinguishing be-
tween "private" corporations, set up for some self-interested end, and "munici-
pal" or "quasi" corporations serving the public. 244 During the same era, courts
began defining municipal rights according to statutory standards rather than
usage and common law procedures. 245 In Stetson v. Kemplon,246 it was specifi-
cally held that Massachusetts towns were municipal corporations, and that they
held only those powers given by the relevant statute.
247
As Williams points out, Stetson is particularly important because it is
the first case that makes apparent the public/private distinction in corporation
law. 24 8 Massachusetts was not the only state to begin distinguishing corpora-
tions as either public or private around this time. In 1818, in Eustis v. Parker,
249
"New Hampshire courts also viewed their towns as public and employed the
terminology of public and private corporations."
250
In New York the issue of municipal corporations was more complicated
than in New England because of the existence and power of two cities with
royal charters: New York City and Albany. After the break with England, New
242 Id. at 1093-94.
243 Id. at 1094.
244 See Williams, supra note 150, at 421-22 (noting that the term "municipal corporation" was
first applied to towns in Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. (5 Tyng) 547 (1809), in which Chief Justice
Parsons contrasted the very limited powers of parishes with the broad powers of municipal corpo-
rations "'to assess and collect money for the maintenance of schools and of the poor, and for the
making and repairing roads, and for some other purposes"' (quoting Dillingham, 5 Mass. (5 Tyng
554)).
245 Id. at 422. (In Mower v. Inhabitants of Liecester, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 247 (1812), "[t]he
court's opinion once again set up an opposition between 'corporations created for their own bene-
fit' and 'quasi corporations,' and linked Massachusetts town powers with state statutory author-
ity."' (quoting Mower, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) at 250)).
246 13 Mass. (12 Tyng) 272 (1816).
247 Id.
248 Williams, supra note 150, at 429 (stating that the "assumption that municipal corporations
were purely public suggests that Massachusetts courts had gone a substantial distance towards
assimilating the public/private distinction into corporation law by 1816").
249 1 N.H. 273 (1818).
250 Joan C. Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 64
Tex. L. Rev. 225, 234 (1985).
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York reaffirmed pre-existing charters while also granting its legislature the con-
stitutional power to grant new and modify old charters. For several decades the
legislature refrained from aggressive use of its power over charters. 251 More-
over, between 1800 and 1830 New York courts went so far as to refuse to treat
the towns as corporations at all.252 This position was dictated by the power of
New York City. Should the courts hold that towns were corporations, they
would have to either cede all control over them by recognizing that the state
constitution's provision on charter inviolability applied to all public corpora-
tions or assert the legislature's power to change any corporate charter at will. 
253
The first option was unacceptable to the state, the second to New York City.
Early on, New York City and the state struck a bargain according to
which the City's Common Council repeatedly petitioned the state legislature for
approval of its actions and approval was almost always granted. "[B]y 1815 the
New York Supreme Court had made it a legal presumption that state legislation
touching on municipal government reflected the stated preferences of that gov-
ernment.''254 In other words, the court took it for granted that the state legisla-
ture consistently abided by the desires of the city in legislating for it. The city
sought the approval of the legislature because it wanted to align itself with the
state. 255 The city also wanted the legislature's approval because some people
mistrusted the city's republican character because it had been founded by royal
charter.256 By going to the state legislature for approval of its actions, the city
undercut its authority, but it was still exercising local autonomy by preparing
legislation and submitting it to the legislature with the foreknowledge that the
legislature would approve it.
The key turning point in the history of American local government
came with Trustees of Dartmouth v. Woodward.257 Here, the United States Su-
preme Court had to determine whether the state of New Hampshire could inter-
vene in the affairs of the private corporation of Dartmouth College; it was in this
case that the Court established the legal distinction between municipal corpora-.... 258
tions and corporations set up for business or charitable purposes. In holding
251 See HOWARD LEE McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACrICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 4
(1916) (ascribing state restraint to the small size of towns during this period).
252 Williams, supra note 150, at 400.
253 See id. at 393-94.
254 HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 98 (1983).
255 See id. at 126.
256 Teaford, supra note 222, at 692-93.
257 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
258 David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 487, 498 (1999).
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that the legislature could not alter the college charter, the Court emphasized the
private, contractual nature of the charter, defining it as a vested property right of
the original grantor.259 Chief Justice Marshall went further, stating that the legis-
lature did have the right to alter "public" corporations like municipalities be-
cause such corporations are mere instruments of government created and prop-
erly ruled by the state.
2 60
The differences between New England and New York can be seen in
how Dartmouth affected the course of municipal law in each. Because prior to
Dartmouth New England already had accepted the public/private distinction,
Dartmouth merely confirmed the ongoing trend of treating cities and towns as
public corporations.26 1 In contrast, in New York confusion regarding the status
of local governments reigned for forty years after Dartmouth.
Beginning in the 1820s, New York courts worked out the public/private
distinction in a manner significantly different from that in New England. New
England courts separated public from private corporations; New York courts
separated public from private functions within municipalities. 262 In the third
edition of his Commentaries, Chancellor Kent developed this governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction.263 According to Kent, municipal authority consisted
of legislation for the public good and possession of property for municipal use;
Kent asserted that, because towns were founded by governmental entities, only
their proprietary possession was due protection from state control; such remains
the law today regarding cities.
264
Between 1831 and 1842 the New York Supreme Court developed this
distinction in a series of cases dominated by Justice Samuel Nelson. In People
v. the Corporation of Albany,265 Nelson held that a city had only those powers
specifically granted in its charter. In this case, there being no provision in Al-
bany's charter authorizing it to cut down the bulkhead of the Erie Canal, the fact
that doing so was necessary for the public health did not alter the need for spe-
cific authorization from the legislature for such action. 266 In People v. Mor-
259 Williams, supra note 150, at 395.
260 Barron, supra note 258, at 501-02 (quoting Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518).
261 Williams, supra note 150, at 240 ("Although most New England lawyers by 1820 accepted
the existence of two mutually exclusive categories of public and private corporations, they had yet
to agree on how to define the 'publicness' of municipal corporations or the 'privateness' of busi-
ness corporations.").
262 See Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826)
(upholding city bylaw repealing its covenant with the church for quiet enjoyment).
263 Griffith, supra note 231, at 302.
264 Frug, supra note 82, at 1104-05.
265 11 Wend. 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
266 HARTOG, supra note 254, at 208. Cutting down the bulkhead was necessary to remove
garbage rotting in the Erie Canal.
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ris,267 Nelson emphasized the distinction between private corporations, which
were "the private property of corporations" and so proper subjects for protection
from legislative action, and municipalities, which were mere "political institu-
tions" incorporated "for the good government of the people." In the latter case
there was no contract; the state owed no duty in regard to "their creation, con-
tinuance, alteration, or renewal" save to the public, and thus incorporation was
indistinguishable from other public acts.
268
Finally, in Bailey v. the Mayor of New York, 2 69 Nelson defined the pub-
lic and private spheres of municipal corporations. 27  The Croton waterworks
were constructed to supply the city of New York with water; Bailey concerned
the city's liability when the dam built for these waterworks broke and damaged
a dam downstream.27 1 In denying municipal liability in this case, Nelson held
that operation of the waterworks was a private activity because the city owned
the company, as property. 272 This holding flew in the face of assumptions by
both city leaders and the state legislature that the waterworks project was a mu-
nicipal activity for the public good. 273 Thereafter, judges took it upon them-
selves to determine, independent of legislative intent, the public or private na-
ture of municipal activities. 274
By 1846, in the state of New York even the cities' right to select their
own local officials was being undermined-despite a state constitutional provi-
sion that guaranteed that very right. The cities were denied the right to select
their local officials in three main ways. First, the legislature would create a spe-
cial commission and appoint its officers; the courts found that the constitution
did not prohibit the appointment of officers who performed "temporary" func-
tions, even if those commissions lasted for years. 275 Second, the legislature
would "abolish an existing 'city office' as such, create a geographical district
larger than the city, provide for the central appointment of the officers of this
district, and empower them to carry on the functions formerly performed by city
officers." 276 Third, the legislature, with judicial sanction, took upon itself the
power to appoint "any officer in any city provided the functions of that officer
267 13 Wend. 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
268 HARTOG, supra note 254, at 210.
269 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
270 HARTOG, supra note 254, at 226.
271 Id. at 225.
272 Id. at 226.
273 Id. at 227.
274 Id. at 228.
275 McBAIN, supra note 251, at 35-36.
276 Id. at 36.
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had not been performed in that particular city by some local officer prior to
1846." 277 Through these means the state legislature effectively controlled the
governing of cities.
278
In 1857 the New York state legislature asserted its utter dominance over
municipal governance, proclaiming its freedom to intervene at will. 279  The
courts affirmed this power in People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 28 upholding the
right of the state legislature, in opposition to a provision of the state constitution
authorizing local governments to elect and appoint their own officers, to abolish
the local police departments of New York City and Brooklyn and replace them
with a state controlled Metropolitan Police District. The court's reasoning?
The state legislature possesses "the whole law-making power of the state."
281
Thus, over time, New York's distinction between public and private
functions in municipal corporations lost its capacity to protect local autonomy.
Even New York City's ferry grant, previously seen as a property interest prop-
erly in the city's "private" sphere, was now considered a proprietary interest
which, like all other municipal interests and powers, was to be utilized in the
282interests of the state. "New York courts ultimately combined their version of
the public/private dichotomy with New England's and held that municipalities
were public corporations that nonetheless exercised both public and private
powers. 283 This formulation was followed across the country.
284
Once state supremacy had been established, all attempts to defend mu-
nicipal rights were ineffective. In the doctrinal forefront of such attempts during
the late nineteenth century was Thomas M. Cooley, who maintained that local
self-government is a matter of right to be protected from state usurpation. Ac-
cording to Cooley, municipalities, not being mere creatures of the state, had no
need for delegated authority.295 While the state had the authority to establish
277 Id. at 38.
278 Id. at 40 (citing floor debate during the Constitutional Convention of 1867-68 during which
the statement was made that "of the entire amount raised for the annual support of the city of New
York more than three-fourths ... are disbursed by those who hold their appointments under state
authorization and who are in no way responsible to the people of the city").
279 HARToG, supra note 254, at 237.
280 15 N.Y. 532 (1857).
281 Viteritti, supra note 228, at 13.
282 HARTOG, supra note 254, at 257-58 (citing People v. The Mayor of New York, 32 Barb. 102
(1860)).
283 Williams, supra note 250, at 236.
284 Id.
285 Harold A. Olsen, Procedural Barriers to Suits Against the State by Local Government, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 431, 434 (1996).
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municipalities, Cooley argued in The People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut,286 "[t]he
right in the state is a right, not to run and operate the machinery of local gov-
ernment, but to provide for it and put it in motion." 287 Cooley based the legal
doctrine of local sovereignty on English common law tradition and quoted Toc-
queville frequently in defining the doctrine.288 He further noted that in America
the towns preceded the states, and did not lose their autonomy on creation of the
states. In People v. Hurlbut, he wrote that "the constitution (was] adopted in
view of a system of local government well-understood and tolerably uniform in
character, existing from the very earliest settlement of the country [and] the lib-
erties of the people [were] generally... supposed to spring from and be depend-
ent upon that system." 
28 9
Cooley's doctrinal arguments would have protected municipal rights
from state usurpation, but by 1900 they had been rejected firmly in favor of the
Dillon Rule. John F. Dillon actually formulated two influential doctrines
limiting municipal power. The first barred municipalities from issuing bonds
for railroads or other "private" purposes. The second subordinated cities to their
states, making any autonomous activity difficult and a matter of leave rather
than right.
29 1
Dillon sought to address corruption and other problems ascribed to mu-
nicipal financing of railroads during the period following the Civil War.292 His
solution was strict enforcement by the state legislature of the public/private dis-
tinction regarding municipal activities, along with judicial oversight of the legis-
293lature. Key to this solution was Dillon's insistence that all appropriate mu-
nicipal activities were by nature "public."
294
In Hanson v. Vernon, 295 Dillon applied the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause to limit the state legislature's ability to impose a "tax" by way of
a bond issue. The statute in question actually did not impose the "tax" directly,
but rather authorized municipalities to issue bonds to aid the railroads. Dillon
struck down the statute on the grounds that the tax lacked a permissible "public"
286 24 Mich. 44 (Mich. 1871).
287 Williams, supra note 250, at 148.
28a Viteritti, supra note 228, at 699.
289 Id. at 11 (quoting People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, at 98).
290 Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIs. L. REV. 83, 89-90 (1986).
291 Id. at 94.
292 Id.
293 Frug, supra note 82, at 1110-11.
294 ld. at 1111.
295 27 Iowa 28 (Iowa 1869).
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purpose.296 According to Dillon, it was the responsibility of the court to enforce
the public/private distinction against state as well as municipal action.297  As
Williams remarks, Dillon's opinion was based on "an extremely innovative doc-
trinal argument .... Use of the fourteenth amendment to protect property, rather
than civil rights, is of course a hallmark of the constitutionalism of the Lochner
Court."
2 9 8
The second major doctrine Dillon formulated was that ascribing to the
states plenary power over municipalities. Dillon's Rule was set forth in his
1872 treatise on municipal corporations:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of the law that a mu-
nicipal corporation possesses and can exercise, the following
powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accom-
plishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corpora-
tion - not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, rea-
sonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of a power
is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power
is denied.
299
Dillon stated the state-centered reasoning behind this rule in City of
Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R:300 "Municipal corporations owe their ori-
gin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It
breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it cre-
ates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control."30 1 Thus
Dillon, in the guise of transmitting the common law, overturned it, in the proc-
ess destroying municipal autonomy and empowering the courts to determine the
bounds of public and private activities. As Williams notes, both of Dillon's
doctrines "served to translate a policy question about which there was little con-
296 Barron, supra note 258, at 508.
297 Id. at 526.
298 Williams, supra note 290, at 96.
299 ERNEST S. GRIFFITH & CHARLES R. ADRIAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOvERNMENT:
THE FORMATION OF TRAomoNS, 1775-1870 39 (1983), (quoting JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 101-02 (5"h ed. 1911)).
300 24 Iowa 455 (Iowa 1868).
301 Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American Federalism: Images
Romantic and Real, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 683, 708 (1997), (quoting City of Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids & Missouri R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (Iowa 1868)).
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sensus-the proper scope of city power-from the realm of the legislature into a
technical legal judgment suitable for a judge."
30 2
As an antidote to city powerlessness after the universal adoption of Dil-
lon's Rule, many states, beginning with Missouri in 1875, enacted home rule
legislation or drafted constitutional provisions granting local government auton-303
omy. Constitutional provisions in particular could be seen as establishing
greater municipal autonomy by preventing legislatures from denying home rule
authority.304 The purpose behind the home rule movement was to give local
governments control over local matters. However, it was at a court's discretion
to interpret the constitutional provisions and legislative acts that created home
rule, and "the courts have not found home rule to be a compelling reason to real-
locate authority away from the state legislature. ' 305 In addition, courts were
instrumental in defining which matters were strictly local in nature, generally
siding with the legislature and against the cities. 306 As a result of court interpre-
tations, the home rule movement did not significantly affect state control over
cities.
Another way cities attempted to restrict legislative interference in local
affairs was by supporting constitutional provisions against special legislation,
"that is, legislation applicable only to a particular local governmental unit."
30 7
The legislatures circumvented these provisions by defining a class of cities in
such a way that the class only applied to one city. 308 The courts upheld this
legislative end-around.
30 9
By 1907, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that local gov-
ernments were completely subservient to the state. In Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh 31 the Court declared:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the gov-
ernmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them ....
The State ... at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such
302 Williams, supra note 290, at 99.
303 R. Perry Sentell, The Georgia Home Rule System, 50 MERCER L. REv. 99, 102-103 (1998).
304 Goldner, supro note 230, at 260.
305 Viteritti, supra note 228, at 14.
306 Viteritti & Russello, supra note 301, at 709-10.
307 Cynthia Cumfer, Original Intent v. Modern Judicial Philosophy: Oregon's Home Rule Case
Frames The Dilemma For State Constitutionalism, 76 OR. L. REv. 909, 912 (1997).
308 MCBAIN, supra note 251, at 72-73.
309 Frug, supra note 82, at 1116.
310 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
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powers .... repeal the charter and destroy the corporation ....
In all these respects the State is supreme and its legislative
body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as
it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States.
3 t t
Today, then, municipalities stand to the states as boroughs stood to the
English monarch prior to formalization of quo warranto proceedings. Charters
provide no substantive rights to either the municipality as a corporate group or
to the local citizens as members of that group. Altered or revoked at will, with-
out cause or due process, the charters are nothing more than statements of cur-
rent policy. This situation resulted from a decades-long campaign to strip mu-
nicipalities and their citizens of rights of self-government in their localities.
Mayors, town councils and other local leaders lost the right to exercise control
over local administrations and even to set up and control their own police
forces-rights even heavy-handed kings during the medieval era had ceded to the
boroughs. And the citizenry, from having the right to control its own local af-
fairs in a wide-range of areas including economic regulations, health, safety and
morals, lost such direct control in the town meeting and even the right to mean-
ingful voting rights in the locality as cities increasingly became mere adminis-
trative units doing the bidding of the state. As municipalities lost rights neces-
sary for control of their own destinies, so did their citizens.
IX. RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION
The public/private distinction might be seen as increasing the rights of
business corporations. It established the sanctity of business corporation char-
ters and agreements as contractual property rights. Individuals' investments in
corporations have gained great protection. Corporations also may be seen as
having acquired increased rights. More than a century ago, corporations in
America even began being accorded a number of constitutional rights of indi-• 312
viduals, such as that against unreasonable search and seizure. But the result
has not, in fact, been a substantive increase in either the rights of groups or the
rights of persons. The corporation has become less a person than a machine for
the generation of income. Corporations today are defined as structures owning
property, acting and in particular having legal existence and liability separate
from that of their shareholders.3 13 Though its roots lie in corporate groups
311 Goldner, supra note 230, at 259, (quoting Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-
79 (1907) (alteration in original).
312 Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REv. 173, 183 (1985) (noting that it was the decline of the view that corporations were
created by grant of the state that allowed them to be accorded rights as individuals).
313 COX ET AL.,supra note 206, § 7.1.
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through which members exercised the right to control important aspects of their
lives in common, the corporation today has reduced shareholders to mere pas-
sive investors, as it has reduced managers to mere income maximizers.
Real autonomy involves moral decisions beyond technical concerns re-
lated to profit maximization; it concerns substantive ends about the kind of life
one wishes to pursue with one's fellows, the kind of person one wishes to be.
The corporation is no longer considered to aim at such ends; it no longer has the
right to be a moral actor. Moreover, the shareholders no longer have the right to
act morally within the corporation. They no longer have the right to pursue
moral conduct through their participation in the corporation. According to the
court in the seminal Santa Clara3 14 case, shareholders, at least since 1883, have
"only a right during the continuance of the corporation to participate in its divi-
dends, and, on its dissolution, to a proportionate share of its assets[.] ' 315 Fur-
ther, the grant of constitutional rights to corporations did not increase share-
holder rights; instead it stripped them of standing to sue over corporate man-
agement decisions. 316 Thus it furthered two trends destructive of both individ-
ual and group rights: reduction of shareholder control, and reduction of corpo-
rate purpose-the appropriate end of the corporation-from common moral
action to mere profit.
Through the end of the seventeenth century, there remained at least a
memory of the business corporation as a combination of head and members,
incorporating without standing utterly apart from them, as evidenced by corpo-
rate names like "The Governor and Company of the Bank of England," created
by Parliament in 1694.317 Moreover, these corporations had substantive pur-
poses-for example trading companies were to conduct business and organize
common life in particular geographic areas-affording purposive group auton-
omy. Such is no longer the case.
A business corporation may be seen as one formed to secure pecuniary
gain for its members; much the same might have been said of a merchants' guild
during the medieval era. But the form of the business corporation, despite its
many differing ends, was not distinguished from those of municipal, ecclesiasti-
cal and charitable corporations early on. Indeed, at the end of the eighteenth
century, there was not as yet a well-defined formal classification for business.. 318
corporations. The reason was simple: differing corporate groups were not all
that different.
314 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R.. Co., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
315 Id. at 402-03.
316 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income
Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 59 n.19 (1990).
317 COX ET AL. supra note 206, § 2.2.
318 DAvis, supra note 155, at 3.
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Like the municipalities, business corporations in America grew in large
measure out of the trading companies responsible for colonization. Also like
municipal corporations, early business corporations combined economic with
more public ends. More specifically, economic corporations began to be formed
during the late eighteenth century in England. But such corporations were
formed (by royal charter or act of Parliament) generally only to accomplish acts
of significant public utility such as railroad and canal construction (deemed nec-
essary for industrialization). Ordinary commercial enterprises were generally
organized as unincorporated joint stock companies, lacking corporate privi-
leges.
319
Within the colonies, almost all corporations were established for reli-
gious and/or charitable, rather than business purposes. 320 Indeed, Joseph S.
Davis observes that incorporation solely for business purposes was so uncom-
mon that the presumption must be that it did not take place during this era.
2t
This is not to say that business corporations did not exist, only that the vast ma-. 322
jority were local public service corporations.
The mixed public/private character of business corporations continued
after the revolution. American business corporations commonly were centered
on provision of financial or municipal services: building and running turnpikes,
bridges, wharfs and water supplies. Banks were the most important business
corporations during the period immediately following the revolution.323 These
corporations provided significant public benefits by creating credit and financial
infrastructure. 324 Despite their success in terms of both number and capital,
however, banks' expansion slowed significantly after 1793. Banks had satu-
rated their markets, reducing profits and, with them, pressure for additional
charters. 325 Municipal services corporations, on the other hand, continued to
expand. These corporations provided public improvements without raising
taxes. Thus, state governments often sought to encourage their formation by
investing in the corporations themselves or guaranteeing corporate debt instru-
ments, thereby mixing public with private capital.
326
319 COX ET AL., supra note 206, § 2.2, at 32.
320 James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for
Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 622-23 (1985).
321 DAviS, 5upra note 155, at 65-66.
322 Id. at 5.
323 Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation: Of Banks, Corporate
Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 1011, 1012 (2001).
324 George F. Carpinello, State Protective Legislation and Nonresident Corporations: The
Privileges and Immunities Clause as a Treaty of Nondiscrimination, 73 IowA L. REV. 351, 389
(1988).
325 DAviS, supra note 155, at 295.
326 Carpinello, supra note 324.
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In addition to supporting their capitalization, states aided business cor-
porations by bestowing monopoly trade status and granting specific tax exemp-
tions, the power of eminent domain, and/or exemptions from military service for
corporate employees. 327 State charters also often brought with them the power
to assess local members for deficiencies or capital requirements. 328 Some states
even granted lottery privileges as a form of supplementary aid.329 In exchange,
the state often received discounted corporate stock or substantial tax pay-
ments.
330
There was substantial opposition to the spread of these specially privi-
leged business corporations. One objection was that such corporations, as con-
centrations of power and wealth, were inconsistent with a democratic society.
331
Another objection concerned the standard process of incorporation by special
statute, with its susceptibility to corruption. Related to the second objection
was a third, to the direct state involvement in private enterprise. 333 Despite op-
position, however, after the revolution, increased capital accumulation from the
war, along with an increased supply of labor from former soldiers and relation-
ships formed in wartime, spawned increased incorporation. 4 Between 1789
and 1801 over 270 charters were granted for business corporations.
335
Certain state supports for business corporations dwindled over time. By
the 1840s many states began prohibiting further direct involvement in corporate
business' operations. A brief resurgence of state-primarily local-corporate
involvement during the 1870s was short lived. By the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, states generally refrained from direct financial interest in business corpora-
336tions. Over the course of the nineteenth century, courts also began denying
business corporations any automatic monopoly status and asserting limited li-




328 CoX ET AL., supra note 206, § 2.3, at 33.
329 DAVIS, supra note 155, at 327.
330 Carpinello, supra note 324.
331 Id. at 390.
332 Horwitz, supra note 312, at 181 (noting the roots of anti-corruption concerns in Jacksonian
democracy).
333 See infra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
334 DAVIS, supra note 155, at 6-7.
335 Id. at 8.
336 Carpinello, supra note 324, at 397-98.
337 Cox ET AL., supra note 206, § 2.3.
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Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to view the attempts at state in-
volvement these developments blunted as somehow linked to an earlier view of
the corporation as inherently public in nature. The mixing of public with private
functions had changed radically in character by this time. The medieval view
had treated corporate groups as having autonomy and purpose of their own-
London's rights were linked to its flourishing as a city. Alternately, nineteenth
century public concerns were linked to the use of business corporations for par-
ticular economic ends-treating corporations as tools for achieving industriali-
zation rather than as independent sources of legitimate, autonomous common
action. Any chance that the municipality-based guilds of the medieval era might
become the model for business corporations was eliminated by hostile statutory
actions against guild associations during the eighteenth century-guilds were
treated as illegal restraints of trade and dealt with accordingly.
338
Modes of incorporation also reflected the changing perception of corpo-
rate groups, with corporate purpose of decreasing significance over time. After
initial grants from the English crown, the vast majority of colonial corporations
were formed by grants from colonial proprietors, governors, or assemblies, de-
spite there being no provision for such methods at common law.339 Incorpora-
tion by special statute followed. In 1811, New York began allowing persons to
incorporate by compliance with a general statute, rendering the process much
easier in the manufacturing sector in particular. Although the process became
easier, the corporation's life would be limited to 20 years, with capitalization not
in excess of $100,000.340 Beginning in 1835 and again in 1888 there were
spurts of activity in other states regarding numbers and liberality of general in-
corporation statutes. Then in 1896, New Jersey enacted what may be regarded
as the first permissive modem incorporation act-that is, a statute that conferred
broad powers on corporations, empowered promoters of corporations to set up
almost any kind of corporate structure they desired, granted broad powers to
corporate directors and managers, and provided great protection against liability
for corporate directors and managers. Corporations also began legally holding
stock in other corporations. 34  Other states followed suit.
The era of corporate trusts had begun. And trusts separated corpora-
tions from their members, making shareholders owners of something that owned
338 CHARLES E. RicE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 22 (1962).
339 DAVIS, supra note 155, at 3, 10 (noting that colonial authority to incorporate was presumed
to be delegated from the crown). A discrepancy here arises, however, as, in English law, one
corporation could not create another. Therefore, the incorporation of entities by the colonial au-
thorities was theoretically impossible.
340 Cox ET AL., supra note 206, § 2.2, at 31; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 457 (2d ed. 1985) (1973) (arguing that limits on capitalization declined over the
course of the nineteenth century) (listing the "obsolete" Massachusetts capitalization limits during
the late nineteenth century).
341 COXET AL., supra note 206, § 2.2, at 31.
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something in its turn, thus distancing them from businesses of which they at one
time would have been a part. At least as important, the demise of charters
spelling out any particular corporate purpose beyond profit, the rise of the busi-
ness judgment rule, and the commodification of corporate stock by the early
twentieth century had succeeded in separating ownership from management.
General charters meant there was no means by which members could become a
cohesive moral group with common ends-and no means by which they could
control management other than through the demand that management produce
profits. The business judgment rule added to and expanded upon these elements
by insulating management and directors from liability to shareholders so long as
they act with reasonable care and within their scope of authority, without self-
dealing.342 Commodification reduced stocks from shares of ownership to secu-
rity interests.
Morton Horwitz has dealt with the means by which commodification
occurred, arguing that the late nineteenth century saw a switch from a theory by
which incorporation was a grant from the state, through which certain busi-
nesses were granted exceptions from the common law, including limited liabil-
ity, to an "entity" theory, according to which corporate businesses, with their
privileges, began to be treated as normal ways of doing business, over which the
state should have no particular power.343 In reality, what took place was a re-
duction of courts' treatment of the corporation to a base form of utilitarianism
lacking any focus on the corporation's purpose, content or internal logic.
Contemporary theories of the corporation have little to do with the cor-
poration; they are merely attempts to conceptualize the legal relations courts
must sort out in particular cases. As long ago as 1938 a court could state:
[A] corporation has no need of defining it as a person or an en-
tity, or even as an embodiment of functions, rights and duties,
but may treat it as a name for a useful and usual collection ofju-
ral relations, each one of which must be ascertained, analyzed
and assigned to its appropriate place according to the circum-
stances of the particular case, having due regard to the purposes
to be achieved.
344
Because courts seldom look beyond the contract in front of them in their
dealings with corporations, contemporary commentators can state that "[t]he
'charter' is properly regarded as the entire corporate constitution, arising from
the incorporation papers and the applicable corporation laws. It constitutes a
contract between the corporation and the individuals who become shareholders
or members of the corporation." 345 The charter also can be viewed as a contract
342 FRIEDMAN, supra note 340, at 450.
343 See generally Horwitz, supra note 312.
344 In re Estate of Witkind, 4 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1938) (quoting Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Pierson, 222 N.Y.S. 532 (1927)).
345 Cox ET AL., supra note 206, § 3.11, at 56.
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between the organizers and the state; the duties and rights flowing from the arti-
cles of incorporation, and the state incorporation laws can be viewed as forming
a "nexus of contracts" that is all there is to the corporation. Indeed, the theory
of the firm as a mere nexus of contracts stems from Ronald Coase's view that
firms exist solely on account of their status as less costly alternatives to market
transactions. This analysis concludes that firms, with their hierarchical decision
making structures, exist only to limit transaction costs associated with negotiat-
ing and enforcing contracts in the market. Accordingly, this has spawned sig-
nificant literature examining business corporations as essentially collections of
individual contracts.346 On this view, the corporation exists purely as a mecha-
nism for transactions. It is an "entity" in the sense that it is an undefined being
about which little is currently known.
The road from grant to entity took decades to traverse. There remained,
even with the Dartmouth decision, some understanding of the corporation as
having a substantive purpose, control over which was constitutive of the rights
of the members. In Dartmouth, Justice Marshall referred to a corporation as the
means by which "a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for
the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being." 347 The object
in Dartmouth was establishment and running of a particular kind of school; such
was laid out in its charter. 348 Marshall refused to allow New Hampshire to sub-
vert that purpose. But what if the directors of the corporation themselves sought
to subvert its purpose?
For decades courts attempted to enforce a purposeful vision of the cor-
poration through use of the ultra vires doctrine. According to that doctrine, a
corporation could only enter contracts and perform acts authorized by its charter
or the law creating it and those not expressly prohibited which also were "fairly
regarded as incidental to and consequential upon those things which are author-
ized by the charter." 349 The purpose of the doctrine was to make clear who was
contracting for what; the stockholder was not to be held accountable for acts of
which he or she was not informed and which he or she did not approve. Parties
contracting with the corporation were deemed to have constructive knowledge
of the proper scope of conduct of directors and agents.350 Notice was given
346 See, e g, George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal
Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117
HARV. L. REv. 1102, 1103 n.1, 1105 n.10, 1162 (2004) (providing a general overview of the or-
ganizational literature spawned by Coase).
347 Trustees of Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
348 Id. at 554.
349 REUBEN A. REESE, THE TRuE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §
47 at 69 (reprint Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1897).
350 Id. § 1, at 1.
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specifically in the instrument creating the corporation, which would list its pur-
pose, powers and members, as well as listing who could bind the corporation.
351
Such actions may be seen as intending to protect corporation members,
seeing to it that their investments would be used to further the corporation's
stated purpose. But one should keep in mind that courts also sought to protect
the state's interest not only in the corporation's benefit to the public, but also in
profit to investors. 352 And the first purpose, that of protecting stockholders,
increasingly came to mean protecting investments rather than control. Over the
course of the nineteenth century, courts put increasing restrictions on the power
of corporations to make assessments on shareholders and developed a doctrine
of limited liability that overruled existing practice. According to this doctrine,
stockholders often were deemed liable for twice the par value of their stock until
the corporation's liabilities were paid off, as well as being liable to corporate
employees for wages.
353
As the justification for the doctrine of ultra vires-that the corporation
is a creature of the law, granted only those powers specifically stated in its char-
ter-came under criticism, courts' application of that doctrine slackened. Be-
tween the era before the Civil War and 1930, courts went from strict to almost
non-enforcement of ultra vires, with more and more peripheral activities being
held to fall within the scope of the corporation's purpose and management's
proper sphere. Moreover, general incorporation statutes undermined the logic
and applicability of the doctrine because they allowed companies to incorporate
for any lawful purpose, leaving no purpose to be enforced.
354
The effect of a successful ultra vires claim was that the shareholders es-
caped the need to pay for the actions of the corporate managers. This aspect
further emphasized the increasing separation of ownership from management.
Neither partial performance nor the assent of every one of the shareholders
could validate a contract not within the corporation's scope of powers. 355 Thus,
shareholders were held to be separate from the corporation.
In the end, shareholders' increased protection from liability came at the
expense of their rights of control over the corporation. By 1900, corporate di-
rectors no longer were seen as mere agents of the shareholders, but rather as the
corporation itself.3 56 One important factor contributing to this ascendancy of
management was the demise of the Trust Fund doctrine. This doctrine held that
the capital stock of a corporation was a trust fund held for the benefit of corpo-
351 Id. at § 3, at 3-6.
352 Id. at § 4, at 7-8.
353 FRIEDMAN, supra note 340, at 451.
354 Horwitz, supra note 312, at 186-87.
355 Oregon R. & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian R. Co., 130 U.S. 1, 22 (1889).
356 Horwitz, supra note 312, at 183.
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rate creditors, for which corporate shareholders would be held personally liable.
Thus, for example, if the stock had been watered (sold for less than its par value,
often with fraudulent intent) the shareholders would be held liable for the differ-
ence on the grounds that they had left less than the full amount available to pay
creditors. 357 The growth of large, anonymous markets in stocks often left small,
innocent shareholders paying for the frauds of others, undermining the doc-
trine's legitimacy and causing courts during the 1890s to erode its application.
As the national market in stocks converted small, cohesive groups of sharehold-
ers sharing common substantive goals (e.g. founding a religious community in
the new world or helping their city flourish by providing it with clean water)
into impersonal investors with no common interest beyond profit, it rendered
untenable the view that shareholders were members of a corporation, not fun-
damentally different from partners. Shareholders now were mere investors, they
"came to be treated as completely separate from the corporate entity itself.' 358
The increasing size of American markets and corporations clearly was
an important factor in the separation of ownership from management. As Hor-
witz relates, when American business enterprises were small, the partnership
form was preferred, and even those businesses which incorporated tended to be
owned by only a few stockholders, who did not buy or sell their shares on the
open market. 359 Thus, before increased size led to dependence on mass stock
markets, corporate members were a small enough group to maintain a cohesive
vision of what their corporation should do and how.
All this changed over the course of the nineteenth century. By the
1880s it was becoming clear that management, and not the shareholders, held
the decision making power in large corporations. Shareholders were simply
passive, atomized investors interested only in profit-itself not properly an end,
but rather a means to other more substantive goals centering around the building
of a good life lived in common with one's fellows. 360 By 1919 a commentator
would state that "[ilt cannot be too strongly emphasized that stockholders today
are primarily investors and not proprietors.
' 361
This limited view of the role of shareholders spawned, as it was fur-
thered by, changes in the means by which corporations might change their pur-
pose and nature. Courts had imposed a requirement of shareholder unanimity
for fundamental changes to the corporation. By the 1890s states were passing
357 Id. at 207.
358 Id. at 209.
359 Id. at 209-10.
360 See generally ARISTOTLE, 2 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE BOOK I (B. Jowett, trans. 1885)
(describing the purpose of acquisition and household management as the securing of sufficient
means and leisure to lead a good life).
361 Horwitz, supra note 312, at 206-207 (citing J. CARTER, THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION
AS ALEGAL ENTITY 160 (1919)).
55
Frohnen: The One and the Many: Individual Rights, Corporate Rights and the
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
legislation providing for majority rule in such instances.362 Also, by the end of
the nineteenth century, power was centralized in management through limita-
tions on shareholder voting rights, in particular the provision of exclusive statu-
tory powers in managers and the replacement of weighted voting with one-
share-one vote.
363
Corporate management had become the corporation, a legal entity
wholly separate from the shareholders. It was the corporation that owned prop-
erty, with shareholders holding only an indirect interest in the property and
business, entitling them to a share of the profits and the distribution of assets
upon liquidation. Moreover, the corporation itself had the right to sue offi-
cers over issues of control and financial mismanagement. Shareholders could
defend their rights directly only through a class action lawsuit-a device fore-
shadowed as early as the 1830s. In addressing the question of what standard
would be applied to management conduct in such lawsuits, Lawrence Friedman
observes that courts "looked to the concept of fiduciary obligation. The officers
and directors were trustees for the corporation. This meant that officers could
not engage in self-dealing; they could not buy from or sell to the company; they
were strictly accountable for any profits they made in transactions with the
company." 365 Only self-dealing and gross negligence could bring personal li-
ability of directors; otherwise, management's "business judgment" would rule.
Along with the death of the ultra vires doctrine and changes in voting rules,
institution of the business judgment rule stripped from shareholders the right to
control management and both determine and follow through on the corpora-
tions' purposes.
Even as business corporations became more powerful, both they and
their members lost crucial individual and group rights. Reduction of the busi-
ness corporation to a machine for generating profits certainly contradicted thenotm ofor ac 366
notion of organic unity behind the entity theory. But this development accu-
rately reflects the subsequent demise of rights, whether inhering in shareholders,
managers, or the corporation as a whole, to pursue substantive moral ends
through business conduct.
Corporations no longer are allowed to mix public with private ends.
They no longer include even substantive business purposes in their charters-no
limits on business conduct that could allow for the development of moral inter-
action within a specific sector of a particular industry. Shareholders of given
362 Id. Many of these statutes also enhanced the ability of directors to initiate actions making
fundamental changes to the corporation.
363 Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict ofInterest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1, 6
(1992).
364 Cox ET AL., supra note 206, § 7.2, at 108.
365 FRIEDMAN, supra note 340, at 449-50, 452.
366 Horwitz, supra note 312, at 183.
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business corporations rarely form a cohesive group with a particular moral vi-
sion. There no longer exists a meaningful sphere of autonomy within which
corporation members may control their common actions and pursue goods in
common within the corporate form in the realm of economic activity.
Even the assumptions of current corporate theory dehumanize everyone
involved. Daniel J.H. Greenwood notes that corporate managers today com-
monly are held to be trustees for fictional shareholders whose sole desire is the
maximization of profits. Such a view causes corporations to act in ways that
this fictional shareholder would desire, but not necessarily in a manner any ac-
tual, living shareholder would approve. 367 The dignity of the person, and of the
group, at the root of rights theories is thereby denied as the actual conduct of
corporations is pushed, in the name of a theory, away from the actual prefer-
ences of living, breathing human beings.
X. RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND THE DIVERSITY OF GROUPS
Neither townships nor business corporations are any longer capable of
serving as makeweights against the power of the state. Business corporations
may be seen as influencing the central government-as Jouvenel saw all indi-
viduals seeking to influence the new, total state. 368 But one thing they do not do
is limit the state's power to control the lives of people in their constitutive
groups. Where once society was composed of a multitude of diverse groups in
which people sought to act with one another so as to pursue a variety of com-
mon goals, today the model is one of an overarching state protecting the rights
of individuals from other individuals, from any group that might attempt to take
actions they find offensive, and from the state itself.
But who guards the individual rights so valued in this political society?
It is the state which stands alone as both guardian and guarded. A multitude of
authorities, aiming at differing ends, engaging in a mixture of political, eco-
nomic and purely social acts, allowed space for each person to carve out his or
her own sphere of autonomous action while also pursuing substantive goods in
common with his or her fellows. Before lauding too vociferously the accom-
plishments of the unitary state and its rights regime, we would do well to con-
sider the rights it has destroyed through its hostility to corporate groups. It is all
well and good to point to the undoubted injustices of the past, but to ignore the
dangers of the current state, along with the loss of variety, social engagement
and moral choice it has brought, is to reduce real diversity and choice to a matter
of consumerism, which can be provided without effective rights.
367 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trus-
tees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1022-29 (1996).
368 JOUVENEL, supra note 74, at 395 (arguing that individuals in a democratic state in which the
central government has done away with all makeweights have no choice but to seek control over
the machinery of power in order to lead lives not enslaved to that power).
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